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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Spectacle earns its special status by enthralling its spectators: It "speaks" to its 
audience in a language of hyperbole, magnitude, and wonder. Such strategies are designed, in 
part, to overwhelm viewers, mythologize the subject, and brand its representations as icons of 
power. At the same time, however, spectacle can serve to liberate the viewer's imagination, 
activate a group's collective memory, and embrace viewer, subject, and the objects 
represented in a coherent and collective identity.  I will call these strategies Big Rhetoric, a 
discourse of outsized objects (or texts) and overwhelming events (or performances) that 
operates, alternatively, to aggrandize, captivate, and ennoble its audience. My use of the term 
Big Rhetoric differs from its use by rhetorical scholars who refer to the “rhetorical turn” in an 
assortment of disciplines.1 My discussion approaches the study of Big Rhetoric as a type of 
communication and a means of persuasion. The study aims to investigate the use of scaled 
objects as a disruptive form of rhetoric and links the dramatic expression of big objects in 
Hellenistic Rome with the novel strategies of representation cultivated by the “nationalizing” 
spectacle of the 19th century world expositions.  
In Chapter 1 the concept of spectacle is discussed based on Guy Debord’s theory of 
representation (having the characteristics of enslavement, domination, and separation). The 
underlying premise in Debord’s work is that forms of spectacle in a capitalist society attempt 
to separate society from the real by transforming reality into a commodity. My dissertation 
                                                
1 I use the term as a substitute for the use of oversized objects. Although the term was originally coined in Alan 
Gross and William Keith’s Rhetorical Hermeneutics, my reference is to its broadened framework in studies of 
architecture and size. To clarify the differences, Edward Schiappa and other rhetorical scholars distinguish 
between big rhetoric, which refers to everything being described as “rhetorical,” and small rhetoric, a term used 
to separate “rhetoric” (doxa) from epistemic ways of knowing (episteme). For a more comprehensive treatment 
of the popularization of rhetoric see notes below.  
 viii 
complicates this one view of spectacle by introducing the idea of Big Rhetoric as an 
expression of magnitude and as an example of disturbance. I define the concept in the 
introduction and then apply it in each chapter by addressing such problems as how Big 
Rhetoric is made, the use of Big Rhetoric by political and other social institutions, and how 
Big Rhetoric and the practice of speaking loudly can be used to modify and reshape the built 
environment. Chapters 2 and 3 answer some of these questions by exploring the strategic use 
of the concept in two “golden ages”: The golden age of Hellenistic Rome and the golden age 
of 19th century America, broadly considered. The two case studies provide especially rich 
sites for analyzing Big Rhetoric: these rhetorical texts upset expectations of normalcy and 
compensated for that disturbance with delectare (delight). For the penultimate section of this 
study, I provide a reading of Frank Gehry’s proposed Dwight D. Eisenhower memorial in the 
D.C. National Mall, which based on the previous chapters, becomes an example of the 
persistent use of memorials as a medium for speaking loudly in a contemporary dialect. In 
examining western traditions of Big Rhetoric, this dissertation advances a theoretical 
framework for considering the rhetorical practice of magnitude that can be utilized in future 
rhetorical work. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
BIG RHETORIC: THE ART AND RHETORIC OF SPECTACLE IN CLASSICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide a rhetorical understanding of spectacle and 
to correct a limited earlier view held by Guy Debord and others as a means to that end. 
Although modern spectacle may serve to subjugate, as Debord suggests, the qualities of 
disturbance serve to liberate as well as to enslave, and where the boundary between the real 
and the unreal may be called into question, spectacles such as the one’s introduced in this 
discussion can awaken the imagination by disturbing our sense of normalcy. In general, then, 
I intend to interrogate two sets of alternatives regarding the use of spectacle—one related to 
audience response, the other to the treatment of the subject—both of which are variable in 
their use. Aristotle says in Rhetoric I.1 that the rhetor "may confer the greatest of benefits by 
the right use of [materials], and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly" 
(1355b).  Spectacle is similarly amenable to either.  
 My discussion is divided into three parts. The first part will lay out the relationship 
between spectacle and megethos (magnitude) with the purpose of discerning the nature of 
Big Rhetoric in Alexandria during the reign of the Roman emperor Diocletian. Diocletian’s 
systematic approach to managing the empire is aimed at disguising the unbridled power of 
Rome, which I contend constituted a necessary strategy for gaining public support from 
vassal states that considered themselves independent of Rome. The second part will draw 
from personal accounts of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition to discuss the 
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opportunities Big Rhetoric provides for audience participation in defining the public 
spectacle. In setting up a carnival-like spectacle at the world’s fair, Sol Bloom draws upon 
the public’s appetite for the unexpected and the unfamiliar; his sources of inspiration range 
from the Giant Ferris Wheel to the provocative and controversial Algerian Belly Dancers in 
the Midway Plaisance. Bloom’s selections stem from a pressing concern that underlies the 
genre of the world exposition: to make the whole experience unforgettable in the eyes of 
fairgoers. Finally, I conclude with a brief look at the influence of post-modernism on Big 
Rhetoric in order to raise an issue for additional consideration: whether Big Rhetoric can help 
mitigate the problems associated with remembering the past. Specifically, can the disruptive 
qualities of Big Rhetoric, as shown by Gehry’s proposed memorial of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, provide us a useful tool for a more refined and complex form of history-telling, 
one that both remembers the past but remains critically aware of the positionality of the 
storyteller.  
 
On Definitions 
 It is important to clarify how spectacle and Big Rhetoric will be used in this discussion 
and to provide a description of the different types of spectacles examined, their different 
features, and their different rhetorical purposes. Originating from the Latin word 
spectaculum, spectacle is most often defined in dictionaries as a “visually striking display or 
exhibition.” To be a spectacle, the phenomenon must result in some kind of strong emotional 
response from the audience, whether it be amazement or wonder, that has disturbed the 
boundaries of what is perceived as normal or everyday. Although it is often created through 
some material presence, like a display or exhibition, according to this definition, the display 
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itself does not qualify as a spectacle. The audience response must be factored in when 
determining if the display qualifies as spectacle. Guy Debord disagrees with this 
interpretation that the audience participates in helping define a spectacle. He describes 
spectacle as an enduring condition of manipulation, a visceral experience that circumvents a 
community’s faculties of reason and judgment. According to Debord, in his book Society of 
the Spectacle, spectacle demands “passive acceptance” without “allowing any reply,” and in 
that sense it is a form of domination that “subjects human beings to itself” (12, 16). For 
Debord, spectacle is the opposite of dialogue; it perpetuates a great lie by society and induces 
a hypnotic state in the audience (17).  
Thomas Farrell, like Debord, believes public spectacle overpowers its audience, and 
adds that it must be categorized as a deviant form of rhetoric. Spectacle should be thought of 
as “a weak hybrid form of drama, a theatrical concoction that relies upon external factors 
(shock, sensation, and the passionate release) as a substitute for intrinsic aesthetic integrity,” 
says Farrell (168). Because spectacle uses its size and scale to overpower the audience, 
creating a “passionate release,” Farrell believes it obscures the less dramatic, the less 
spectacular, and as a result obfuscates those things that possess “aesthetic integrity.” 
While other rhetorical theorists have provided a much broader definition of spectacle 
than Farrell, they continue to provide anti-spectacle arguments to expose its hegemonic role 
in modern society. For Watts and Orbe, spectacle has no beginning and no foreseeable end, 
and as such the spectacle of advertising works continuously to interpolate the subject and 
change the way we ascribe value to the world. In this view, the task of advertisement is not 
so different from the public enslavement described by Debord, as both theorists see spectacle 
as a long-term rhetorical strategy that works continuously to affirm certain messages about 
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the world. In both cases, the public spectacle is a tool of manipulation used to control what 
the audience thinks, feels, and believes. The argument advanced by Watts and Orbe, and by 
Debord, is that spectacle uses its power of persuasion to do little more than excite and arouse, 
inducing a sort of trance-like state in the audience; this definition of spectacle highlights 
spectacle’s ability to stimulate human appetites, a condition Debord describes as 
zombification. Debord’s zombie-like state and Farrell’s “weak hybrid” show spectacle to 
have little integrity and dangerous consequences. The academic commentary on 
contemporary spectacle assumes that its artificial cultivation, its rhetorical staging, is merely 
visual excitability. 
When spectacle is seen in this way, rules must be used to limit its use in public 
discourse. The confusion surrounding spectacle centers around its particular characteristics:  
spectacle displays visual expressions that stimulate the sensible experience of human 
perception; it is a means of inducing a mutual reaction from the public; and is a multi-sensory 
experience that may result in shock, surprise, or instant immersion. Because spectacle must 
capture our visual attention in a short space of time, images are designed to stimulate 
people’s visual sensory experience to make a long-lasting memorable impression.    
 However, for David Procter this memorable experience is a means of producing 
dialogue, not silencing it. Procter emphasizes the audience’s role in public spectacle and 
answers the question as to what happens—consciously or unconsciously, cognitively or 
psychologically—when the audience first experiences a visually arresting display. He begins 
by probing the practical or theoretical consequences of the audience’s participation by asking 
what the relationship is between the private and the public, or how and where meaning is 
made, authenticated, and authorized. Spectacle in this view is more than “official messages at 
 5 
a court where no one else is allowed to speak” (Debord 23); it is a site of community 
building, a place where the new and unexpected is discussed by those who experience it. 
Spectacle in this view participates in a process of community formation. As Procter writes, 
“interpretations or accounts of the event are the spectacles and within these spectacles exist 
the dynamic rhetoric of community” (118). Procter argues that the interpretations of the 
spectacle are the spectacle.  
While broader than most notions, Procter’s interpretation still relegates the art of 
spectacle to a one-to-one relationship between visual text and those persons who experience 
it. However, in the case of architecture, the visually arresting structure is never separate from 
its environment. Spectacles like the ones chosen for analysis in this dissertation modify 
public spaces and are themselves modified by the built environment. Spectacle therefore 
requires a broader definition than those offered by these theorists. Though spectacle can be 
seen as "empty" or "theatrical," as secondary to other features, or as positively harmful, there 
are reasons for thinking otherwise, at least in particular cases. In rhetoric, the equivalent is a 
matter of “empty rhetoric,” per the sophists as Plato described them. My way of phrasing the 
problem is to ask how something so big (a column, an exposition, a memorial) can also be 
"empty." The pun here has the advantage of posing the question of whether scale and size of 
the spectacle is really the crucial factor.  
 
Big Rhetoric, a Useful Concept 
The primary effects of Big Rhetoric are not to persuade the audience, but, as 
Longinus says in On The Sublime, to “transport them out of themselves.” He explains how 
this effect surpasses other persuasive strategies: “Invariably what inspires wonder, with its 
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power of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing.” The 
object’s capacity to amaze exceeds simple persuasion because “our persuasions are usually 
under our own control, while these things exercise an irresistible power and mastery and get 
the better of every listener…A well-timed flash of sublimity shatters everything like a bolt of 
lightning” (12.1-5). The power of Big Rhetoric is located in its ability disrupt, yes, but also to 
break down barriers, to remake the world, not only in terms of traditional responses, but 
stripped of the weight of established associations. The ability of the rhetorical text to sustain 
spectacular effects in an audience depends on the text’s ability to convey this sense of 
magnification, to promise to transport the audience to someplace beyond what is known. 
Conversely, a text that cannot produce that world cannot produce a spectacular effect.  
As Miles Orvell notes, one of the effects of using big objects in public places is found 
in "the discrepancy between the imagined world and the real world" (226). The discrepancy 
between the real and imagined has the ability to disrupt normative expectations for the 
spectator who is both reading the image and imagining its meaning. The important qualities 
of Big Rhetoric in this case are not its size but the dynamic tension it creates between itself 
and its surroundings. One modern example of this discrepancy can be found in the artwork of 
Claes Oldenburg. His famous sculpture, Spoon Bridge and Cherry, demonstrates the 
disruptive potential of Big Rhetoric. 
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The giant spoon (See Figure 1) stretches 
52 feet across a small pond, creating a strange 
juxtaposition between the enlarged spoon and the 
cityscape behind. Disrupting the quiet serenity of 
the pond, the strategic use of bigness shows how an 
optic disturbance creates cognitive dissonance for 
the auditor. Oldenburg explains that by using 
familiar subjects as persuasive units (like a Greek 
column or a giant wheel), the artist can create a visual paradox for the spectator. The 
experience becomes intensified when the artist uses objects on a grand scale that are 
traditionally known on a small-scale from intimate situations. This scaling up of the banal 
forces a strange experience onto the viewer and will “reduce the scale of the real landscape to 
imaginary dimensions” (Artnetweb.com). By scaling-up everyday objects, the rhetor has 
created a discontinuity in the normal landscape and made the ordinary seem strange. By 
placing the large-scale object in a public space, like downtown Chicago or in a holy site 
overlooking Alexandria, the rhetor has made the supposed “real” seem strange and frees the 
auditor to question what is familiar and what is imaginary.  
 Rather than simply reproducing a Greek symbol on Greek scale, Diocletian in his effort 
to address rising hostilities in the city of Alexandria adopted a strategy not unlike 
Oldenburg’s Spoonbridge. Diocletian decided to blow up the symbol of the Greek column in 
such a way that the landscape and other artifacts around it, the reigning symbols of 
Alexandrian culture and religion, were reduced in the cultural imagination to echoes of their 
former selves. The result is a new kind of orientation to the visual experience of Alexandria.  
Fig. 1 Spoonbridge and Cherry by Claes 
Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen, 1985-
1988, aluminum, stainless steel, paint  
354 x 618 x 162 in.  
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 Disruption, then, is an ‘inherent’ quality of Big Rhetoric. The rhetoric of disruption—
how it is planned by the designer/rhetor, how and why it is registered by the viewer—
provides a link between monumentality, public spectacle, resulting enthrallment, and the 
eventual imaginative, collective reconstruction. Aristotle says in Bk. II of the Rhetoric that 
all strong emotions disturb us and that we naturally seek ways to resolve that distress. If 
monuments / exhibits can "disturb" normative expectations, then, according to Aristotle, we 
will naturally seek ways to reconfigure our views in ways that accommodate the discord. 
This raises a point on the notion of memory and spectacle: mneme (Gk) was initially 
conceived of as not just what we recall from the past but of all that we can bring to mind at a 
given moment, and it operates by making experience that is distant in some way present in 
the mind of the viewer. The artifact elicits a package of memories, but they are our 
memories; and while the designer (the original rhetor) may have some dianoia (purpose in 
mind), we are the ones in the present who are engaged in the interpretation of what is before 
us by reference to what is in our minds.  
 My approach differs from Debord and Farrell in that my subject is the material text, the 
articulated response expressed by the audience, and the network of buildings, roads, and 
greenery that constitute the built environment. I wish to argue that spectacle in contexts such 
as these has the unique ability to invite a collective response from the audience—a response 
that allows auditors to participate in rather than adjust to reality. Or, to repeat myself, the 
monument, the viewer, and their environment, are in dialogical relation, which calls on the 
viewer's rhetorical capacity to speak back in response to such Big Rhetoric.    
 In an effort to explain how Big Rhetoric may be considered a useful subcategory of 
spectacle, I draw from a classical understanding of the term opsis, roughly translated as 
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visual spectacle. In Book VI of the Poetics, the empiricist Aristotle describes opsis as one of 
the five elements of drama. The elements include mythos (story), opsis (the seen, or visual), 
melos (music, melody), lexis (speech), and dianoia (theme).  Aristotle uses the term opsis to 
refer to the visual elements of the play, its capacity to speak through the objects and 
backdrop on the stage. From the Greek word for optics, “appearance, sight, view,” Aristotle 
uses the concept to discuss the materiality of the play as separate and distinct from the story 
of the play:  “. . . the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage 
machinist than on that of the poet” (Book 6). While Aristotle’s separation excludes opsis 
from the art of poetry, his brief discussion of the term yields some insight into how it might 
be seen as a useful rhetorical concept.  
 Aristotle explains that the visual spectacle, while less important than the words of the 
poet, still has the potential to generate a strong emotional response from the audience. In this 
way, spectacle is a kind of rhetorical force that interacts with the play but remains 
independent in some ways from the story and, thus, has its own dramatistic effects. 
Traditionally, criticism has argued that in a well-made drama the distinction between mythos 
and dianoia (fable and idea) collapses; I am arguing this same coalescence happens between 
opsis and dianoia: what we see and the ideas that it arouses (via memory) are inseparable. To 
borrow from Coleridge, the two become "a distinction without division" (14).  
The primary claim I hope to make is that these monumental texts first disrupt, then 
invite; they encourage audience reflection (this is especially true in the Gerhy design); and in 
some cases they challenge memories of the past. The experience with these large objects is a 
moment of disruption and deliberation that can lead to opportunities for collective creativity. 
Even in the case of Diocletian’s Column, the size and wonder of the column are more than a 
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political maneuver; they change the cultural landscape of the Serapeum by inviting the 
people of Alexandria to contemplate and discuss what it means to be Greek, Egyptian, and 
Roman.  
Not unlike Diocletian’s use of the Greek column in Alexandria as a means to disrupt 
the traditions in Alexandria, western nations in the 19th and early 20th centuries made use of 
grand expositions to negotiate their position among the global elite. At the London exposition 
of 1851, the Crystal Palace was a colossal glass structure used to house England’s newest 
inventions and to communicate English ingenuity. The capacity of these rhetorical texts to 
transform modern life lay in their ability to provide a sense of wonder for the audience. 
When considered a rhetorical form, spectacles like the London exposition spoke broadly and 
persuasively about life as shaped by mechanized production in the new industrial age and the 
dream of escape from the blight of urban sprawl. Richard Atkins suggests that international 
expositions were intended to give form to the future: “through them the vicarious became the 
immediate, the theoretical and general became concrete and specific” (1). The experience of 
attending the fair was not only an escape from the dullness and suppression of the moment 
but was also a persuasive argument for its transformation. For multitudes of both literate and 
illiterate spectators, the world of tomorrow materialized through the spectacle of the world 
exposition. 
 From these two vantage points, I identify comparable approaches to using large objects 
to propagate a dialogue about the future. The expositions of the 19th century reveal the 
complicated ways American cultural distinctiveness and "exceptionalism" were in dialogue 
with a classical aesthetic, and also bring into focus the unique methods of the American 
cultural mission to advance its growing economy. What emerges in these pages are 
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overlapping, often conflicting approaches to using rhetorical means to break down barriers of 
past associations. From Diocletian’s pragmatic approach and Roman imperialist intentions, to 
the straightforward acknowledgement of American exceptionalism in the later 19th century, to 
Frank Gerhy’s belief in a careful democratization without Americanization, Big Rhetoric 
remains, crucially, contextual and situated.   
 
Methodological Approach 
 The purpose of my work is to acquaint rhetorical scholars with the persuasive potential 
of Big Rhetoric. This is a complex task that involves a basic understanding of the nature of 
rhetoric and architecture and how to approach it. To be a work of architecture, a physical 
structure must be built and have some function for human beings. This structure produces a 
recognizable change to the physical landscape, a modification that alters the environment for 
a particular purpose. Flavio Conti explains, “Buildings do not exist in isolation. They not 
only impose their character on their surroundings but also have an incalculable effect on the 
lives of the human beings who inhabit them” (25). The rhetorical potential of architecture to 
persuade can be found in the physical structure and its ability to “impose its character” on the 
landscape. Structures for Conti work to modify a city or town, but they themselves are also 
modified by the people who use them.  
 The relationship between architecture and its environment is explained in more detail 
by the architect historian Christian Norberg-Schulz. Architecture, says Schultz, is a means by 
which we participate in a system, a network that is constantly being modified by human 
beings and their activities. Schulz believes the roads, squares, and greenery create a “network 
of interrelated components which are connected with practically all human activities.” The 
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connectivity of the different parts of the network all work in concert with one another, and at 
the center are the human activities that give meaning and shape to the network. Even in 
ancient Rome, architects like Vitruvius believed the study of architecture was also the study 
of humanity: students should master, in addition to drawing and arithmetic, music, literature, 
and philosophy.  
 For the purposes of Big Rhetoric, architecture will be considered a rhetorical practice 
of manipulating the physical environment for particular persuasive aims. Following this line 
of thinking, the rhetorical agent is an agent of change, someone who works to disrupt 
Schultz’s “network of interrelated components.”  Although exploratory in nature, my 
discussion is based on this central premise: architecture may serve as a means of redemptive 
communication that has the potential to create a new reality for the spectator. To explore how 
Big Rhetoric accomplishes its objectives, I compare three examples of speaking loudly. This 
historical instrumental case study is guided by the concept-oriented approach to rhetorical 
criticism. Among those who use this approach in rhetorical studies, James Jasinsky stands 
out as an exemplary model of inquiry into the concerns that guide a new generation of 
rhetorical scholars. Jasinky’s essay “The Status of Theory and Method in Rhetorical 
Criticism” approaches rhetorical criticism from a theoretical understanding of human 
rhetorical behavior. His study of rhetorical criticism is immensely useful in its extensive 
coverage of conceptually-informed interpretive analysis. This rhetorical scholarship engages 
in conceptual reflection and refinement “as part of the practice of criticism” (Jasinsky 259). 
The objects of reflection are explored using a three-pronged approach: 1) examination of the 
context and rhetorical situation in which the rhetoric was performed, 2) identification of a 
rhetorical concept that appears most useful for the analysis of the particular rhetorical 
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artifact, 3) repeated close readings of the visual text, keeping the rhetorical concept in mind 
as it comes in contact with the artifact and the audience’s response to the artifact throughout 
the analysis. My framework similarly provides flexibility in the application of critical tools to 
the various texts and concepts I explore. I apply the critical tool most useful to explain the 
workings of each text within its discursive network, but my overarching goal will be to gain 
insight into the use of Big Rhetoric in different and often overlapping historical contexts.  
Overall, I intend to address one primary comprehensive question: what are the 
inherent qualities of Big Rhetoric? The dissertation does not seek to examine the historical 
accuracy of the Roman occupation of Alexandria, nor does it attempt to examine the 
physiological process of remembering. Instead, it serves to document particular instances of 
Big Rhetoric and the ways in which these events disrupt, alter, and in some cases liberate our 
memory of the past and our views about the future. The study is spread across three genres of 
representation—monuments, expositions, and memorials—because I saw common features 
of Big Rhetoric through spectacular effects shared across a variety of forms of visual 
expression. These case studies endeavor to expose how the brilliance of Big Rhetoric works 
to awaken the imagination and disturb our senses.  
The concept of Big Rhetoric is viewed in this study as a phenomenon that awakens 
our consciousness by generating a strong emotional reaction in the audience. Spectacles from 
this point of view are not simply visual extravagance that dampen our capacity to speak back. 
This definition of the concept stands in contrast to Debord’s notion of spectacle and a society 
governed by commodity. Debord insists that spectacle stimulates our desire to consume, 
concentrating on fantasy rather than direct experience and forcing us to participate in the cult 
of consumerism. However, a spectacle is not merely a fantasy of consumerism, but a social 
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relationship of people mediated by visual expression. It is a worldview explored and 
negotiated in something physical and substantial. Contemporary examples of Big Rhetoric 
offer new forms of visual experience that have the capacity to respond to users’ reactions. 
The surface of contemporary memorials and monuments, like the Gehry design, can be made 
up of images that appeal to the senses and ignite the viewer’s imagination.  By re-defining 
the role of spectacle in this way, urban spaces can produce long-standing memorable 
interactions that penetrate the environment in which we live. 
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NOTES      
_____________________   
 
Many in the field of rhetoric debate the idea of big versus small rhetoric. Rhetoric and media 
studies scholar Edward Schiappa noted, 
Within the journals and conventions of members of the National Communication 
Association (NCA), popularization is often characterized by studies of the form “the 
rhetoric of X,” where X could literally be anything. Outside of the NCA-defined 
parameters of communication studies, popularization is evidenced by the apparently ever-
increasing ranks of scholars who use “rhetoric” as a relevant and important term of art 
within their scholarship. 
Most scholars who discuss the popularization of rhetoric include some discussion of the 
communication scholar Dilip Gaonkar and his critique of the “globalization of rhetoric.” 
Gaonkar explored globalized rhetoric in "Rhetoric and Its Double: Reflections on the 
Rhetorical Turn in the Human Sciences" (1990) and "The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of 
Science" (1993). Schiappa observed, 
Gaonkar suggests that the quality of rhetorical scholarship suffers from popularization. 
According to Gaonkar’s history of rhetorical criticism, “neo-Aristotelianism sought to 
integrate a critical vocabulary derived from Aristotle with a program of historical 
research.” The results, he claims “were dismal” and a “massive failure” (1993, 262; 
1997b, 31). Following the “collapse” of neo-Aristotelianism, two sorts of critical 
approaches emerged. One approach was committed to viewing rhetoric broadly as 
“symbolic inducement.” Gaonkar proclaims that the “critical studies inspired by those 
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theoretical perspectives [phenomenological, structuralist, dramatistic, etc.] were as a 
whole no more insightful than an average neo- Aristotelian study” (1993, 262). 
Gaonkar begins in “Rhetoric and its Double” to suggest that a global definition of rhetoric 
“propels rhetoric to confirm its presence in the discourse of other disciples” (344). His 
argument focuses on the disciplinary integrity of rhetoric, and Schiappa sees a sense of 
“embattlement and fear” in these claims, a preoccupation with academic turf. The separation 
between Goankar’s vision for rhetorical studies and a group of rhetoricians interested in the 
discourse and rhetoric of science is his most well-known and comprehensive critique of 
globalized rhetoric. Herbert Simons maintains, 
Gaonkar had built his critique of a globalized, hermeneutically oriented rhetoric on an 
infirm foundation…Gaonkar’s use of rhetoric of science as the test case for “Big 
Rhetoric” was also fallacious in the formal sense, for it assumed that failure to meet what 
was alleged to be the toughest test would thereby invalidate the entire globalization 
project – this through a kind of reversal of the a fortiori argument. 
In “Rhetoric and its Double,” Gaonkar argues that Aristotle’s available means of persuasions 
is a process of making “knowledge more readily comprehensible and acceptable in the 
domain of civic discourse” (344). But rhetoric by itself cannot produce knowledge. It serves, 
says Gaonkar, to supplement knowledge—accommodating, adjusting, and redefining—but 
never discovering the nature of things (346). 
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CHAPTER TWO: DIOCLETIAN’S VICTORY COLUMN: MEGETHOS AND THE 
RHETORIC OF SPECTACULAR DISRUPTION 
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Abstract 
This essay explores how the powerful system of cultural references in the architecture 
of Alexandria is disrupted by Roman visual rhetoric. Specifically, the essay closely analyzes 
Diocletian’s Victory Column, a monument to the third-century Roman ruler who put down 
an Alexandrian uprising. The authors argue that Rome employed a visual rhetoric of 
spectacular disruption as a means to insert itself into the city’s historical identity even after 
its siege created widespread disease and starvation. The essay builds on the substantial 
scholarship on public memory by describing a kind of rhetoric that poses a political, 
existential challenge to a reigning cultural identity. As rhetorical scholars continue to study 
public memory and the persuasive powers of designed space, the notion of megethos appears 
to be uniquely and increasingly relevant.  
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Introduction 
After three days of travel, a Greek writer in the 2nd century, Achilles Tatius, conveys 
a first impression of Alexandria:  
I entered it by the Sun Gate, as it is called, and was instantly struck by the 
splendid beauty of the city, which filled my eyes with delight. From the 
Sun Gate to the Moon Gate…led a straight double row of columns…I 
tried to cast my eyes down every street, but my gaze was still unsatisfied, 
and I could not grasp all of the beauty of the spot at once; some parts I 
saw, some I was on the point of seeing, some I earnestly desired to see, 
some I could not pass by; that which I actually saw kept my gaze fixed, 
while that which I expected to see would drag it to the next. I explored 
therefore every street, and at last, my vision unsatisfied, explained in 
weariness, “Ah, my eyes, we are beaten.” (Tatius, The Adventures of 
Leucippe and Clitophon 5.2-24) 
Tatius’s descriptive account reconstructs the visual landscape of Alexandria for modern 
readers and highlights the persuasive power of the city’s design. It is evident from the 
description that the landscape to which the writer responds is designed not only to engage 
viewers, but also to overwhelm them. The city’s beauty, scale, and unique repetition of Greek 
forms deluge the spectator’s vision until he and his eyes acknowledge surrender. As Tatius 
continues his narrative, he shifts his attention away from the architectural wonders of the city 
to the evening’s festivities and the many torches that lined the square: “The sun had gone 
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down; but there was no sign of night—it was as though another sun had arisen.” The square 
will soon be filled with spectators and citizens in anticipation of the great procession 
celebrating the Egyptian god Serapis. The torches, Greek architecture, and procession all 
combine to communicate a powerful cultural persona, blending Egyptian and Greek identities 
into a tensely unified whole. As Tatius puts it, “It was the greatest spectacle I ever beheld.”  
As scholars in rhetoric continue to devote considerable effort to the study of public 
memory and the persuasive potential of designed space, Tatius’s account, with its explicit 
reference to the concept of spectacle, suggests an opportunity for further scholarship. 
Alexandria makes for an especially interesting case study because it is a city that has been 
much contested by competing historical, political, and cultural interests. Afflicted by 
resentments, rebellions, and wars, Alexandria is the strategic object not only of rival armies, 
but also of competing symbolic systems. Though founded by Alexander the Great in the 
fourth century BCE, the land was already home to an Egyptian city, which was absorbed by 
Greek development and later became Alexandria’s Egyptian quarter. Alexander’s appointees 
and successors aggressively expanded the city’s size and influence, determined to make it a 
Hellenistic center. Within a century, Alexandria became the largest city in the world, and it 
was remarkably diverse.  
Although Alexander and the Ptolemaic dynasty that succeeded him ensured the city 
was unmistakably Hellenistic in its planning, administration, and aesthetics, Alexandria still 
existed on an “alien landscape” that was home to “a native Egyptian population with its own 
culture, history, and traditions” (Erskine 42). Andrew Erskine observes that the Greek 
domination of the landscape and culture “masks a fundamental insecurity” over the city’s 
essential identity. Nevertheless, the Egyptians and Greeks maintained a relative stability, 
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even if that stability was marked by an undercurrent of Egyptian exclusion and resentment. 
To maintain that delicate equilibrium, Greece employed a sophisticated symbolic strategy in 
which Egyptian and Greek sacred symbols were meshed as a means of grafting the two 
cultures. The result is a rich, public memory landscape marked by complex symbolic battles 
and alliances, and a tense, often failed, sense of civic order.  
This volatile relationship between imperialism, insecurity, domination, and memory 
renews itself with the advent of the Roman Empire, and Diocletian specifically. In this essay, 
we explore the way Alexandria’s rich system of Greek and Egyptian cultural symbols is 
disrupted by a new imperialist rhetoric. Specifically, we perform a close analysis of 
Diocletian’s Victory Column, a monument to the third-century Roman ruler who put down 
an Alexandrian uprising. We argue that Rome, like Greece, used a strategy of symbolic 
meshing but embodied that strategy within the architectural amplification of its own power. 
Diocletian’s Column simultaneously reflects, appropriates, outsizes, and disrupts 
Alexandria’s symbolic identity. We argue that this strategy reflects Rome’s goal to insert 
itself into, and ultimately to dominate, the city’s public memory–even after its violence 
against the city created widespread disease and starvation. We build on the substantial 
scholarship on public memory by describing a kind of visual rhetoric that poses a political, 
existential challenge to a reigning cultural identity. First, we introduce the historical context 
surrounding the construction of Diocletian’s Column and review some of the literature on 
public memory and monuments. Next, we explain how the Serapeum, home to the column, is 
a site of rhetorical contest and cultural fusion. Then, drawing on Burke, Blair, and others, we 
analyze Diocletian’s Column as an example of how the Greek idea of megethos can be used 
as a disruptive rhetoric that alters the landscape of public memory. More specifically, 
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megethos represents a scaled up rhetoric that manages to overcome a paradoxical exigency – 
namely, how an imperial power simultaneously achieves consubstantiation with and 
dominance over an existing cultural identity. Finally, we discuss implications for future 
rhetorical scholarship.   
 
A Context for Diocletian’s Theatrics 
Diocletian’s Column, erected some time between 284 and 385 CE, and the events 
surrounding its conception reflect Alexandria’s history of physical and symbolic violence. 
Alexandria was an essential node in the empire’s economy. It was a conduit for one third of 
the empire’s grain supply and the main portal through which it conducted its trade with the 
East. It was also remarkably wealthy in its own right, but its critical economic output was 
counterbalanced by its history of rebellion and its ongoing resentment for Roman rule. As 
Christopher Haas puts it, the city “had witnessed a number of imperial usurpations” in the 
third century, and Diocletian knew well the danger that Alexandria would pose if it were to 
“persist in rebellion” (21). Its situation was complicated. Alexandria was at once necessary, 
volatile, and rebellious. Samuel Sharpe points out that a core concern for Diocletian was the 
Egyptians’ deeply rooted “hatred of their rulers and the belief that they should then be able to 
throw off the yoke.” To put down the Egyptian rebellions once and for all, Diocletian relied 
on a long-term siege campaign during which he surrounded the city with “ditch and wall, and 
turned aside the canals that supplied the citizens with water” (240). The siege lasted for eight 
months, causing the Alexandrians to suffer terrible privations and ultimately to surrender.   
 Given the delicate nature of the Alexandrian problem, Diocletian treated the post 
siege period with unusual nuance. When those responsible for instigating the rebellion were 
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either captured or killed, including Achilleus, on whom the Alexandrians had pinned their 
hopes for liberation, Diocletian’s soldiers began burning and plundering the city. Diocletian, 
however, abruptly halted the spoil, citing a sign from the gods. As Sharpe explains it, when 
Diocletian entered the city with his troops, “the horse on which he sat stumbled” (240). 
Diocletian interpreted this event as a call to preserve what was left of the city. He further 
demonstrated his munificence by presenting the city with a large portion of grain that was 
scheduled for Rome. He also exempted the people of Alexandria from paying taxes for a 
time. So whether Diocletian truly feared divine retribution or pragmatically recognized an 
opportunity to subdue the volatile city through his generosity, his act of restraint suggests a 
symbolic act worth exploring.  
There are important contextual reasons for why Diocletian might have taken this 
approach to dealing with the Alexandrian aftermath. As we have established, Tatius’s 
account of the spectacle during the celebration of Serapis focused largely on the Greek 
architectural elements of the scene. This small observation is symbolic of the profound and 
complicated cultural tensions in Alexandria between the Greeks and the Egyptian Copts and 
Arabs who reluctantly allied with them in the rebellion. Although the Egyptian citizens had 
been burned by Greece’s historical offenses against them, they knew that the Romans nursed 
profound anxieties regarding their own relationship to the Greeks. They at once emulated and 
dominated the Greeks, absorbing many Greek contributions to culture while at the same time 
insisting on imperial control. Romans also recognized the Greeks as the cultural heirs of 
Alexandria who were entitled to certain political privileges (“Roman Egypt”).  
The Egyptians knew, therefore, that forming an alliance with the Greeks under the 
leadership of Achillius would provide the best possible leverage for victory. According to 
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Sharpe, Diocletian deliberately resisted inquiring just how far the Alexandrian Greeks had 
gone in their alliance with the Egyptians because he knew that such knowledge would only 
exacerbate an untenable situation, requiring ever more military and diplomatic resources on 
an increasingly complicated scale in order to govern northern Africa (see 240 – 243). In 
short, Diocletian knew it was in his best interest not to provoke further Greek resentment lest 
he create grounds for an even stronger alliance between Greek and Egyptian rebels in an 
already difficult and remote region of the empire.  
Diocletian’s Column was erected as a tribute to the ruler’s supposed mercy during 
this period. Mistakenly believed by Middle Age crusaders to be a tribute to General Pompey, 
the column is now widely known to be a salutation to Diocletian following his historic siege.1 
Sharpe even suggests that a bronze statue of the horse whose stumble was so significant once 
stood atop the column. So although Diocletian’s massive siege effectively ended “the bright 
days of Egypt as a Greek kingdom,” the column was erected as a token of gratitude to the 
conquering ruler. In the past, it was argued that the column was erected by grateful citizens 
(see Sharpe 242). But this claim, which is more than a century old, lacks the full context. In 
fact, it is now well understood that the prefect of Rome – that is, the Roman ruler in 
Alexandria, is responsible for erecting the column. So the notion that it was the will of the 
people that the column be erected must be complicated, as it overlooks evidence that the 
column is the result of an executive decision by the rulers themselves. The translation of the 
inscription at the base of the column seems to support this view: “To the most just emperor, 
tutelary of Alexandria, Diocletian, the Invincible, Posthumus, the Prefect of Egypt (has 
erected this monument)” (Taylor 262 - 263). If the Roman prefect, an underling with whom 
                                                
1 To this day, the column is often misleadingly called “Pillar Pompey’s.” 
 26 
Diocletian would have been familiar, was behind the column’s construction, the decision was 
likely a political one, and the column’s placement at the center of the temple of Serapis 
suggests it was designed mostly as a statement to–not from–the Alexandrian people and only 
nominally as a tribute to the conquering emperor.  
Our speculation here is supported by historical profiles of Diocletian and his methods. 
Diocletian’s early classical and Byzantine biographers diverge widely in their assessment of 
his rule, and they tend to be motivated by their own passionate prejudices (e.g. Rees 12). 
Nevertheless, taken together, these early sources paint the picture of a remarkably effective, 
if dangerous, leader, whose violence is counterbalanced by his “shrewd,” “cunning,” and 
“subtle” ways (99). Indeed, if we are to believe Aurelius Victor, “[Diocletian] was the first to 
introduce regal custom rather than Roman liberty, and he demanded that he be worshipped 
where all previous emperors had been greeted. He ornamented his clothes and shoes with 
jewellery, where before the badge of imperial office was only the purple robe and everything 
else was ordinary” (qtd. in Rees 99 – 100). Although we cannot take as fact such 
contemporaneous assessments of Diocletian’s rule, any objective review reveals a leader who 
was adept at symbolic influence–an expert in war, to be sure, but one who also marshaled 
more subtle tactics to assert political control and establish lasting reform (see, e.g., Mackay 
294 - 295). Edward Gibbon corroborates this view when he argues that, unlike Augustus, 
Diocletian was more interested in the theatrical display of Rome’s power than in actually 
brandishing the sword of Rome: “the state maintained by Diocletian was a theatrical 
representation . . . It was the aim of [Diocletian] to disguise…the unbounded power which 
the emperors possessed over the Roman world” (206).  
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So given the complicated historical context of Alexandria and Diocletian’s history of 
theatrics, we argue that Diocletian’s Column is part of a symbolic, rhetorical strategy to 
restage public memory. The column becomes a means to remake the city’s memory of the 
siege by focusing on the merciful and divinely inspired acts following the siege. Later, as we 
analyze the column itself, we consider its placement at the enter of the Serapeum, originally 
an Egyptian holy site central to the city’s identity; its fashioning as a scaled-up Greek 
column; its singularity as a vaguely obelisk-like structure; and its overall message of Roman 
symbolic dominance, a way of merging subdued cultures into an oversized imperialist 
structure. While these claims move towards generalization, we recognize there are limits to 
the close reading of a single artifact. We do not argue, then, that the column represents a 
universal strategy for Roman dominance, or that it captures the essence of public memory 
rhetoric in some always replicable way. Rather, we analyze the column as a single, 
symbolically rich response to a complex exigency. We argue that this response has at least 
two important payoffs. First, it provides critical insight into the way Diocletian’s column 
functions persuasively, using subtle, symbolic mechanisms to achieve its desired end. 
Second, we show how a particular theoretical concept, megethos, allows an imperial power to 
participate in, disrupt, and overcome the arc of the dominant public memory. Before that 
analysis, however, we review some of the literature on public memory.  
 
Public Memory and Monuments 
Public memory implies, in Steven Browne’s words, “a shared sense of the past, 
fashioned from the symbolic resources of community.” The shared memory is also subject to 
that community’s “particular history, hierarchies, and aspirations” (248). Browne’s idea 
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emphasizes how shared memory, or public memory, is distributed to the public by “symbolic 
resources” that are subject to the particular social context in which they were created. Given 
these characteristics, it is not surprising that public memory has become a robust subfield 
within the broader discipline of rhetoric. As Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki argue, the creation of 
public memory depends upon certain rhetorical resources that shape consciousness, including 
“structural elements, arguments, tropes, narratives, justifications,” and so on (“Memories for 
Sale” 13). So public memories are rhetorical constructions designed to create a shared sense 
of identity for a particular group of people.  
This idea of a shared identity points to Burke’s notion of consubstantiation, a process 
by which rhetoric is deployed to bridge the divide between separate entities (22). Rather than 
merely persuading spectators to adopt a particular behavior, public memories invite them to 
assume a particular identity that they hold in unity with other members of their public. This 
unity performs important functions. R.H. Fuchs, for example, describes society’s “collective 
dream,” which “is never just an absolutist gesture by a ruling class towards its subjects. It 
also reflects how a people or a community wishes to see itself—a collective dream on a 
national fulfillment and honour” (97). So the power inherent in a shared memory does more 
than just establish unity, or “communal identification” (Blair, Dickinson, and Ott 27); it also 
binds a public to certain interpretations of the past and aspirations for the future (see, e.g., 
Stob 253; Blair and Michel “Contemporary” 33; Jorgensen-Earp and Lanzilotti 151). That is, 
the creation of a shared memory hails spectators into a new interpretive space in which they 
form new habits of orienting themselves to the world.  
Interestingly, implied in this reorientation is a process of displacement. As Maurice 
Halbwachs points out, remembering and forgetting are coconstitutive processes; each is 
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essential for the other’s existence. Therefore, rhetorical scholars should be aware that 
drawing collective memories from symbolic resources requires some process of forgetting 
individual experiences. Carol Blair makes a similar assumption when she asks, “What does 
the text do to (or with or against) other texts?” (30). Our own argument relies on this 
assumption. The creation of a public memory implies a negotiation with or reinterpretation of 
the past. Public memory thus carries the potential for violence, a disruption of one narrative 
as it gives way to another. This potential is exacerbated by the fact that only certain invested 
actors have access to the resources necessary to establish public memory. Michael Kammen, 
for example, points out that many of the social institutions that impose particular public 
memories may be controlled by a select few, a dominant group that promotes particular 
ideologies not necessarily endorsed by “ordinary people” (10). These collective 
interpretations may not benefit all groups equally. Diocletian’s Column, after all, appears to 
be the product of a tiny, elite team of Roman leaders who have devised a way to shift the 
collective, public interpretation of their violent acts of social control.   
Most of the rhetorical scholarship on public memory focuses on physical places of 
memorialization or commemoration. Blair, Dickinson, and Ott call them “memory places” 
because they cultivate and sustain “communal identification” (27). Blair and Michel add that 
such places are significant because “they select from history those events, individuals, places, 
and ideas that will be sacralized by a culture” (“Public Memorializing” 377).  In other words, 
the material construction of memory has at least two major rhetorical advantages: It allows 
rhetors to sacralize certain narratives, events, and values, and it enables them to sustain that 
sacralization with an indefinite material presence. As Benjamin Crosby argues, these spatial 
sacralizations are designed to maintain the rhetorical charge of certain “kairic” moments in 
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history (139). Such places therefore can speak and reaffirm messages to multiple audiences 
over extraordinarily long periods of time. For this reason, rhetorical scholars have studied 
everything from Central Park in New York City (Rosenfield) to the Buffalo Bill Museum in 
Wyoming (Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki) to the Memorial Aids Quilt (Blair and Michel “Aids 
Memorial”) to the Viet Nam Veterans Memorial (Blair and Michel, “Public Memorializing”) 
to the Memorial to Robert Gould Shaw and the Massachusetts 54th (Stob) to the National 
Cathedral (Crosby), and the list goes on. Each one of these places represents what some 
invested and empowered group deemed essential to a shared public identity that serves to 
fulfill and sustain some rhetorical vision of the past, present, and future. 
Like the scholars we have referenced, we argue that memory places do more than 
simply remind their audiences of important events in history. Memory places are dynamic 
and dialogic. They interact with their audiences, erasing and replacing memories and 
implicitly calling for assent on a particular, active, publicly shared identity that spans time. 
Kathleen Lamp underscores these particular functions in her essay on the Roman Emperor 
Augustus’s famous building campaign, which allegedly–if mostly metaphorically–
transformed Rome from a “city of brick” to a “city of marble.” Lamp points out that Roman 
monuments in honor of Augustus were designed “not only to celebrate Augustus’s successful 
campaigns (in) Spain and Gaul but also to garner public support for Augustus’s heir and the 
process of dynastic succession” (172). From the beginning, then, the Imperial Roman project 
was designed around rhetorical space through which the past is interpreted and upon which 
the future is poised. For Augustus, as for his heirs, the function of monuments was to “gain 
and maintain power” (172). So Rome’s methods of conquest, despite their heavy military 
overtones, demonstrate a remarkable grasp of the rhetorical power of the visual landscape. 
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And it is clear that Roman leaders routinely availed themselves of their physical environment 
when they made speeches, often gesturing to monuments, statues, and other surroundings in 
an effort to move audiences. So while Diocletian appears to be unique in the extent to which 
he believed in the power of symbols to serve the cause of imperial stabilization and reform, 
he is not essentially different from his predecessors. His methods highlight and expand the 
well-established Roman practice of building rhetoric into the physical landscape. 
As Diane Favro notes, the Roman way of remembering speeches was often tied to 
architectural features in public buildings. Speakers linked parts of a speech, for example, to 
specific parts of a famous public building, and this linking helped them to move from one 
part of the speech to another. This mnemonic strategy was so ingrained, in fact, that 
architects began to design structures with it in mind. More and more Roman buildings took 
on features “that were unusual in scale, color, or form” in an effort to give the public more 
distinct ways of recalling arguments and narratives – especially narratives with a distinctly 
Augustan vision of the city and its history (see Lamp 187; see also Favro 233). Both Favro 
and Lamp are suggesting, then, that Roman structures served to support the more traditional 
medium of speech, but they also reveal that such structures were independently rhetorical 
(see also Aldrete and Vasaly). These structures spoke with their own voices, and as they 
grew in scale, form, and complexity, they took on the potential to speak more loudly than 
other voices, thereby disrupting competing narratives.  
          The importance of scale to disrupt competing narratives and to speak more loudly than 
other voices might be understood better through the lens of megethos, a Greek concept that 
simply translated means magnitude. In book I of the Rhetoric, Aristotle uses megethos to 
describe the role of amplification (auxesis) in epideictic speech:  
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In general, among the classes of things common to all speeches, amplification is the 
most at home in those that are epideictic; for these take up actions that are agreed 
upon, so that what remains is to clothe the action with greatness [megethos] and 
beauty [kallos]. (1.9.1368a.26-30) 
Here Aristotle articulates greatness as action clothed in the grandeur and beauty of lexical 
devices. Megethos, in this tradition, prioritizes the subject—“and the term ‘more’ signifies 
here not only ‘to a greater degree,’ but also (a logical or axiological) priority” (Chroust 33). 
As a product of amplification, megethos establishes the subject’s superiority by virtue of the 
way it outsizes other subjects. The use of megethos, in other words, sways judgment as it 
reorganizes the landscape. Existing subjects are now understood in relation to the new, 
ostensibly dominant subject. .  
 However, ancient scholars and philosophers dispute Aristotle’s claim that amplification 
alone produces megethos. Pseudo-Longinus in the text On the Sublime says amplification 
refers merely to amount and that redundancy and quantity produce a sort of long-winded 
verbosity. 
I must first remark that I am not satisfied with the definition of amplification 
generally given by authorities on rhetoric. They explain it to be a form of language 
which invests the subject with a certain grandeur [megethos]. Yes, but this definition 
may be applied indifferently to sublimity, pathos, and the use of figurative language, 
since all these invest the discourse with some sort of grandeur. The difference seems 
to me to lie in this, that sublimity gives elevation to a subject, while amplification 
gives extension as well. Thus the sublime is often conveyed in a single thought, but 
amplification can only subsist with a certain prolixity and diffusivity. (Longinus 
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12.1-5) 
The Sublime holds that the single idea may be made great if one can establish some singular 
quality of grandeur. Granduer, in this sense, lies in enhancing the subject, not merely 
amplifying its size or scale. Longinus conceives of megethos, in other words, as the raising of 
the singular idea. If megethos is achieved through a process of distinction, it cannot be 
produced without the singular idea being elevated above other ideas. This reading of 
megethos is central to our argument of Diocletian’s Column, because for Diocletian to 
achieve greatness, he must elevate the very idea of Rome in the minds of the Alexandrian 
people in such a way that Rome becomes the singular idea. We are not arguing that Rome 
achieves this distinction merely by crushing the opposition, but by enrolling itself into the 
city’s own symbolic structure, and then asserting control of that symbolic structure by scaling 
it up to recognizably Roman dimensions. Thus, the city’s symbolic landscape is preserved, 
but it has been hierarchically altered. As Longinus says, the goal is “not to persuade the 
audience but rather to transport them out of themselves.” So the effects of megethos require 
some change from low to high, small to large, some transfixing experience that repositions 
the spectator in relation to his or her own cultural memory. For the purposes of our argument, 
this dynamic can be found in the tensions between the memory of what is known and the 
recognition of how that memory has been modulated to comply with a new dominant power.  
 
The Serapeum as Site of Cultural Contest and Fusion 
 
Historians argue that the location of Diocletian’s Column, the Serapeum, used a 
predominantly classical aesthetic, not Egyptian (McKenzie, Gibson, and Reyes). 
Nonetheless, the site must be considered a cultural fusion of sorts, as it contains many 
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Egyptian symbols, including cult statues and other religious artifacts. Before the Greek 
structures were erected, the local Egyptian population came to the high plateau to worship 
the popular statue of Serapis. The site therefore has a rich history of cultural negotiation, 
combining political and religious practice and uniting Greek architecture with Egyptian 
religious symbolism.  
 The blending of Egyptian and Greek culture 
appears to have been part of early efforts to make 
the  Serapeum a highly significant cultural site for 
the city. McKenzie, Gibson, and Reyes explain that 
the Serapeum had two primary purposes for 
Alexandria: to reinforce Greek identity and to 
incorporate the artifacts of Egyptian worship into a 
Greek aesthetic. So although the site largely 
favored Greek interests, it embraced and sacralized 
Egyptian elements as part of the city’s core identity. 
A total of 15 plaques were found in the Serapeum, inscribed with both Greek and Egyptian 
hieroglyphs (82). The two languages on the plaques reveal that both Egyptian and Greek 
practitioners used the structures and that a largely unproblematic union was maintained 
between them. Thus, the Serapeum served as a symbolic anchor for the cultural fusion for 
which Alexandria was famous.  
The topography of the Serapeum helps explain how Diocletian’s Column participated 
in this visually rich rhetorical site. In addition to the temple dedicated to Serapis, the 
Serapeum contained a colonnade court with over 400 columns. Also in the Serapeum were 
Fig. 1. Alexandria, Serapeum, axonometric 
reconstruction of Ptolemaic complex 246-
221 B.C. (Sheila Gibson).  
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two other buildings, a Stoa-like structure and a T-shaped building (See Figure 1). Both 
buildings connected under the courtyard by a secret passage. But archaeologists suggest that 
the Serapeum was used by earlier Ptolemaic kings even before these formidable structures 
were created. For example, Ptolemy 1 erected a sanctuary dedicated to the Egyptian goddess 
Isis and the Greaco-Egyptian god Serapis. Also found within the Serapeum was an altar 
dedicated to Ptolemy 2 and his wife Arsinoe.  Although it was eventually replaced by the 
main Temple of Serapis, the altar demonstrates a lengthy tradition of political messaging in 
concert with the worship of religious deities. Ptolemy 4’s construction of a temple dedicated 
to Harpocrates (Harsus, son of Isis) further illustrates this point. The plaque on the temple 
reads, “King Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy and Queen Bernice, the Beneficient Gods, to 
Harpocrates by order of Serapis and Isis” (McKenzie, Gibson, and Reyes 84). The bilingual 
inscription tells the Egyptian and Greek audience that the great gods Serapis and Isis have 
communion with Ptolemaic kings. They have, in fact, ordered the king Ptolemy to act on 
their behalf and construct this temple, a story not unlike Diocletian’s experience with his 
horse. In both cases, the rulers use communion with the gods as justification for their 
political power. Because the Serapeum is a recognized site of rhetorical contest and cultural 
evolution and fusion, it is a fluid space that becomes repeatedly redefined by the presence of 
new political interests and rhetorical artifacts. 
The Roman phase of the Serapeum appears to have continued the Greek effort to 
appropriate, rather than replace, the symbols of cultural identity. But as architectural 
historian Christian Norberg-Schulz points out, the Roman strategy differed from the Greek 
architectural style in one primary respect: The Roman strategy used “subordination” to 
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communicate the Roman system of governing. Norberg-Schulz explains that the use of size 
and scale to create this effect was a prominent feature of the Idea Romana:  
A relatively simple play of forces is expressed this way, which represents 
a new kind of relationship between the parts of a building. They act 
together, not as individuals but as parts of a system, each part being 
subordinate to the superior idea of the system. In contrast to Greek 
architecture, where every part contained the immanent character of the 
whole, the single part in isolation does not tell us anything about the 
building as a whole.…Its basic intention is to characterize space as the 
stage of god-inspired human action. Space becomes the varied and 
dynamic, but ordered stage where history takes place. (92) 
Norberg-Schulz’s notion of Roman building design stands as a metonym for the Roman 
system of politics and government. The iconic symbolism inherent in classical design, in the 
Greek architectural forms, does not explain Rome’s use of magnitude and the dynamics of 
space to project “god-inspired human action.” Roman architecture differed from Greek 
design primarily in its impulse to cause disruptions in continuity without explicitly 
antagonizing that continuity. Through powerful visual texts, like Diocletian’s Victory 
Column, Rome both subsumed and outstripped the symbolic power of competing cultures.  
 
Diocletian’s Column 
Selecting Diocletian’s Column as a representative artifact raises the question of 
whether or not it is unique. One may wonder, in other words, whether there is anything 
philosophically or rhetorically unusual in its construction. In our contextual analysis, we 
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argued that the delicate historical and economic conditions of Alexandria rendered it unique, 
at least in degree, to the extent that Diocletian did not ultimately plunder the city into 
oblivion. In fact, he compensated the citizens with spectacles of generosity: grain, tax 
exemptions, and so forth. We further argued that he did so because he believed that 
Alexandria should not be provoked to further resentments and rebellions lest it might occupy 
all of Rome’s resources to subdue in perpetuity. Diocletian, we concluded, engaged in a 
sophisticated symbolic campaign to ease Alexandrian passions against him post siege.  
As further evidence of this psychological campaign, consider the inscription at the 
column’s base. We noted earlier that the translated inscription reads, “To the most just 
emperor, tutelary of Alexandria, Diocletian, the Invincible, Posthumus, the Prefect of Egypt 
(has erected this monument).” To be sure, there is nothing unique about a Roman emperor 
being honored with a triumphal column. Such honorifics were part of Roman custom from 
Rome’s regal period through its republican period and into its imperial period. Conquering 
leaders were regularly honored with monuments, often free-standing columns, for their 
military victories. More often than not, these monuments were celebrated with elaborate 
rituals and parades (see Versnel 95 – 96). A typical inscription on such a monument would 
be an epic description of the leader’s military accomplishments in subduing a foreign enemy 
and protecting the empire. In short, such monuments were built in order to “glorify military 
victory and the values underpinning that victory” (Beard 4).  
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A prime example of such triumphal columns is that of Trajan, erected around CE 113 
in honor of the emperor’s victories over the Dacians. The column, which is built of 
individually sculpted drums that were hollowed 
out to accommodate a spiral staircase inside, is 
massive in scale. The inscription winds around 
the column, describing in epic language the 
military victories of Trajan (see “Trajan’s 
Column”). A column dedicated to Marcus 
Aurelius is of similar design and purpose. 
Diocletian’s Column, then, appears to be 
somewhat unusual, because it does not explicitly 
commemorate a military victory; instead, it 
honors an act of conciliation towards fighting 
rebels. It makes no mention, whether in text or 
visual reliefs, of the extraordinary siege required 
to subdue the Alexandrians, suggesting that 
Diocletian’s purpose was far more sensitive 
rhetorically than the most well-known triumphal 
columns would suggest of other emperors at other times. For this reason, Diocletian’s 
Column makes for an especially revealing artifact. Traditional triumphal columns were 
certainly acts of public memory building, but they were designed primarily as 
commemorations of past victories. Diocletian’s Column is more clearly part of an ongoing 
rhetorical project to infiltrate and colonize a competing culture’s memory.  
Fig. 2. Diocletian’s victory column, erected in 
298 B.C. total height of the column is thirty 
meters.  
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  The column’s visual and material presence is broadly consistent with other 
traditional triumphal columns, which are designed as landmarks that help to organize 
physical space (see Figure 2). The addition of Diocletian’s Column to the Serapeum, then, is 
of particular significance, because it insinuates itself into the city’s central holy site. It does 
more than just add a structure to a generic public space; it realigns the city’s sacred center. 
Located in the southwest corner of the Serapeum, the giant column dwarfs other monuments, 
scaling up the Alexandrian world’s own cultural and religious identity in the form of a 
Roman monument. Consider the words of Rufinus of Aquileia (c. CE 373-80), a classical 
historian who describes the Serapeum:  
And in the centre, there rises a column of surpassing height that 
renders the location recognizable—someone leaving would not at all 
know where he was heading, were he not to use the column as a 
reference-point for his journey—and the acropolis visible to land and 
sea. The “beginnings of the world” (archai ton onton) are positioned 
around the capital of the column. (Aphthomi, Progymnasmata 12) 
Rufinus’s words underscore at least three of our points in this analysis. The column (a) 
redefines the landscape and, in so doing, redefines the visual experience of the city; (b) 
disrupts and supplants the prior memory of the city; and (c) reorganizes the Alexandrian 
world according to a Roman hegemony that, short of erasing the previous visual experience, 
insinuates itself into it and begins the process of subordinating public memory to a new 
interpretation. 
In further considering the column as a visual rhetorical artifact worthy of analysis, we 
rely on Blair and Michel’s work on rhetorical materiality (“Contemporary”), in which they 
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outline a heuristic for analyzing memorial sites. Although their work specifically concerns 
contemporary U.S. memorial sites, much of what they discuss applies across history and 
culture and is relevant to our questions about Diocletian’s Column. Blair and Michel consider 
five categories of inquiry: the text’s “material significance,” “durability,” “possibilities for 
reproduction or preservation,” effect on “other texts,” and effect on “persons.” We focus here 
primarily on two categories that seem most relevant to our claims regarding the disruptive 
nature of Diocletian’s Column. Namely, we are mostly interested in the column’s material 
existence and relationship with other texts. We give some consideration to its durability, 
effect on persons, and possibilities for reproduction or preservation. In considering these 
categories, we place particular emphasis on the column’s use of scale and subordination, a 
distinctly Roman principle of critical importance that runs throughout this analysis.    
Blair’s argument that “architecture, like natural language use, expresses degrees of 
significance not just through its symbolic substance but by its very existence” highlights one 
of the central rhetorical strategies behind the erection of Diocletian’s Column 
(“Contemporary” 34). The column actually alters, through its objective material presence, the 
landscape of the Serapeum. As a Roman triumphal column erected in honor of the Roman 
victory over the Alexandrian uprising, the pillar is the largest of its kind outside of Rome or 
Constantinople. And standing at well over 100 feet tall from base to capital (roughly 10 
stories) and nearly 15 feet wide at its base, the column is one of the largest ancient monoliths 
ever erected. At 285 tons, it is also one of the heaviest. Unlike most of the columns in 
Alexandria, this is a “monolithic” column, so rather than being built of sections, or drums, it 
is built of a single piece of stone, the kind of column that might be reserved for temples and 
other holy sites. 
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Corinthian in design, the column’s capital is ornate and eye catching. Its shaft is made 
of a fine, red Aswan granite, which appears grayish from a distance but assumes a more 
refined and distinct appearance the closer one gets to it. Situated at the top of a limestone 
bluff, the column’s base is a square block of marble, stone, and lead that is about 60 feet in 
circumference. By itself, the base is more than 12 feet tall. The impact of these material 
dimensions is significant. Blair and Michel point out that the choice of materials is essential 
to the rhetorical strategy of a monument. Some materials, for example, are designed for 
endurance, to withstand weather, vandalism, gravity, and so on. A message made in granite 
suggests cross-generational permanence, and “such longevity is granted to texts that 
communities see as more important than others” (“Contemporary” 37). Texts, in other words, 
have built-in “degrees of durability,” and these degrees are put on display in the materiality 
of the given artifact. It is not difficult to conclude that Diocletian or, more accurately, his 
Alexandrian representative, had clear intentions as to the degree of durability of the text that 
is communicated by the column. It was to become a permanent and essential fixture in the 
landscape and consciousness of Alexandria.  
Notions of durability slip easily into considerations of a text’s “possibilities for 
reproduction or preservation.” But Diocletian’s Column reveals that the durability of the text 
comes not from the way the text was copied, preserved, or reproduced but from the way it 
copies, preserves, and reproduces prior texts. As we have pointed out, the column is hardly a 
new form of architecture at this stage in Greek or Roman history. Indeed, the choice of this 
particular genre of monumental architecture seems to be a conscious decision to copy, 
reproduce, and preserve the cultural symbols of Alexandria. For not only does the Roman 
triumphal column reproduce a well-known Greek symbol of sacred architecture, but as a 
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lone-standing structure, it also seems to echo, or reproduce, the symbolic power of an 
Egyptian obelisk. Reproduction, Blair and Michel claim, is also a form of intervention, and 
“it is important to grapple with the degrees and kinds of change wrought by it” (38). In 
reproduction, an artifact might be captured “outside of its original context” (Hess 822). Thus, 
reproduction has the potential to reproduce and contest simultaneously. As a reproduction of 
a form, Diocletian’s Column derives from recognizable political and religious contexts in 
Alexandria. Memorialization, after all, is a way of pointing to shared origins. But because of 
the centrality of its location and the massiveness of its scale, the column also challenges the 
form’s context, inviting the viewer to experience it in a new way.  
The column, therefore, is a deliberate material disruption of the landscape. By its very 
material presence, it reorganizes space, and it does so on a bold scale. Unlike other objects 
within the Serapeum the column becomes what Mircea Eliade might call an axis mundi, a 
sacralized center around which an entire world is defined and organized–or in this case, 
redefined and reorganized–in response to the threat of chaos (63 - 64). Blair and Michel 
provide further language for considering the way links are created between texts, and the 
column clearly employs a variety of the methods that they identify. It appropriates familiar 
forms while it also competes with and even silences other texts in the Serapeum. As Blair 
and Michel point out, the presence of multiple memorial sites in close proximity represents a 
competition not only for viewership but also for the right to frame or reframe history itself. 
Like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, which physically changes the context in which it 
resides (i.e., alters the message of the surrounding memorials), Diocletian’s Column is not 
meant to be an isolated symbol. It participates in, physically alters, and culturally challenges 
the human landscape.  
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The primary claim we hope to make is that these monumental texts first disrupt then 
challenge the audience’s memories of the past. The experience with objects such as 
Diocletian’s column is a moment of disruption and reflection that can lead to group 
identification. In the case of Diocletian’s Column, the size and wonder of the column are 
more than a political maneuver; they change the cultural landscape of the Serapeum by 
inviting the people of Alexandria to contemplate what it means to be Greek, Egyptian, and 
Roman.  
The primary effects of megethos are not to persuade the audience, but, as Longinus 
says in The Sublime, to “transport them out of themselves.” Longinus explains how this 
effect surpasses other persuasive strategies: “Invariably what inspires wonder, with its power 
of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing.” The object’s 
capacity to amaze is more powerful than something which convinces us of its veracity, “For 
our persuasions are usually under our own control, while these things exercise an irresistible 
power and mastery and get the better of every listener…A well-timed flash of sublimity 
shatters everything like a bolt of lightning” (Longinus, 4.1-10). Disruption, then, is one of the 
"inherent" qualities of megethos.  
In constructing Diocletian’s Column in Alexandria (Fig. 2), Rome deliberately 
appropriates a symbol shared by both cultures, the Corinthian column. It further stages the 
column in the same way an obelisk is staged, singularly, not as a pillar supporting anything in 
particular but as an axis point around which a whole landscaped is organized. The Roman 
architects erected a recognizable symbol of Alexandrian memory. But rather than simply 
reproducing the Alexandrian symbol on an Alexandrian scale, they blow up the symbol in 
such a way that the landscape and other artifacts around it—the reigning symbols of 
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Alexandrian culture and religion—are reduced in the cultural imagination to echoes of their 
former selves. The result is a new kind of orientation to the visual experience of Alexandrian 
culture.    
The rhetoric of disruption—how it is planned by the designer/rhetor; how and why it 
is registered by the viewer—provides a link between monumentality, public spectacle, 
resulting enthrallment, and the eventual imaginative reconstruction at the collective level. 
Aristotle says in Bk. II of the Rhetoric, that all strong emotions disturb us and we naturally 
seek ways to resolve that distress. If monuments such as Diocletian’s column have the power 
to "disturb" normative expectations, then, according to Aristotle, we will naturally seek ways 
to reconfigure our views in ways that accommodate the discord. The ability of the rhetorical 
text to produce megethos therefore lies in its’ ability to generate disturbance, to communicate 
wonder, and to transport the audience away from the familiar. Conversely, a text that cannot 
produce that effect cannot produce megethos.  
 
Conclusion 
We began the essay with Tatius’s descriptive account of the spectacular Alexandrian 
festival honoring the god Serapis. The entire city was in the thrall of a sacral celebration 
emanating from the temple across the landscape and mindscape of the public. Such 
experiences overwhelm partly because they tend to collapse time itself, providing linkages 
between past, present, and future. These links are often anchored in specific spaces and 
celebratory rituals that are designed to reaffirm communal identities. What makes 
Diocletian’s Column a uniquely complex and rich artifact for analysis is the way that it both 
celebrates and disrupts the identity of the targeted public. The Serapeum is a stage on which 
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the people of Alexandria memorialize and perform their cultural values. The column is a 
monument erected by and to a conquering power. We have attempted to argue the column 
exists as a strategic disruption in memory. Knowing that producing spectacles of punishment 
in response to the Alexandrian uprising would be costly and ineffective, Diocletian chooses 
instead to insert himself into the community’s sacralized landscape. He carries out this 
strategy first by performing benevolent acts of kindness (diverting the grain for Rome back to 
Alexandria and forgiving the tax payments) and then by memorializing his kindness with an 
equally memorable symbol, erected on the most sacred ground in the province. In brief, the 
column is a rhetorical effort to insert Rome into the historical identity of Alexandria and wed 
it more firmly to the Roman collective.  
Research is not clear about whether the column was immediately and fully embraced 
by Alexandrians. Unfortunately, we cannot perform any reliable and detailed reception 
analysis of the artifact. We do, however, have the advantage of a long, continuous history 
throughout which the column stands, and its persistence suggests a remarkable success. 
Diocletian, as we have pointed out, put down a serious revolt in the city by ordering 
Alexandria to be besieged. After eight months, the city finally gave in, but it was stricken 
with disease and famine. Still, the column was built, and it has remarkably outlasted its 
counterparts in and near the Serapeum, most of which are discernable only in trace ruins, if 
they are discernable at all. Even the great temple to the god Serapis is now badly damaged, 
and it was repeatedly attacked during Jewish revolts at the time of Emperor Trajan and 
subsequently destroyed shortly after the advent of Christianity. Even its ruined remains, then, 
are copies of the original. Meanwhile, Diocletian’s Column stands mostly intact.  
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The columns’ geographic reorganization of the landscape is part of its symbolic 
gesture. We have argued that the column disrupts the reality of the Alexandrian narrative by 
blowing it up into Roman proportions, and the consequence of this use of scale is an 
irresistible visual subordination, a dwarfing of the other sacred artifacts in the Serapeum and 
a fundamental reorientation of the Alexandrian landscape. Diocletian’s Column becomes 
arguably the most recognizable landmark in the Serapeum, which is to say, it materially 
changes the way the land is seen and understood. This change is essential to the notion of 
megethos. Diocletian’s Column appears to be scripted as a gesture of goodwill, a reminder of 
a ruler’s generosity and merit in the form of a familiar architectural symbol. We hope to have 
shown that this column it is not merely a commemorative monument designed to celebrate 
commonly held identities, but uses magnitude as a means to disrupt those same identities 
and, in their place, insinuate Roman hegemony.    
We have only scratched the surface of the theoretical possibilities of disruption as a 
rhetorical concept. Although we have identified a useful, historical artifact that embodies and 
communicates rhetorical disruption through the use of public memory and megethos, we 
want to pursue the implications more deeply in future work. What other successful 
disruptions might be useful as objects of analysis? Are all monuments, in some sense, 
disruptions as well as commemorations? Examining the purpose of Diocletian’s Column 
provides access to an important architectural object with abundant historical and rhetorical 
intentions. In the process, our analysis of the column has also pointed to a productive 
interaction of rhetoric and history in reading monumental cultural artifacts. These objects are 
more than static tombstones named for dead kings; they are actors who speak to their 
audiences with unrivaled power about the most pressing social, political, and cultural issues 
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of the moment. It seems likely, then, that there are opportunities for additional research into 
the disruptive nature of such memory places. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DEFINING FERRIS’S GREAT PLEASURE WHEEL: RHETORIC, 
SPECTACLE, AND CULTURAL POLITICS AT THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN 
EXPOSITION 
 A	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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the audience’s reception of George Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel at the 
1893 Columbian Exposition in order to reflect on the politics of public spectacle. Noting that 
the exposition was articulated quite differently by different cultural groups, I explain how 
organizers of its “Amusement Zone” used the rhetoric of public spectacle to challenge the 
educational model imposed on the exposition, establishing a rhetorical text that was 
subjective and personal, and creating opportunities for public reflection and imagination. 
Focusing on the disruptive qualities of public entertainment and public spectacle at the 1893 
exposition rather than understanding the 1893 exposition as purely a vehicle for 
disseminating conventional mores can furnish complex points of view on the experience of 
audience members, and engaging with the ubiquitous public response in this way can 
strengthen the project of rhetorical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Sole researcher and author. 
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Introduction 
 
At midday, May 1, 1893, President Cleveland pressed the "magic Electric Button" to 
ignite the great Allis Engine in Machinery Hall and officially open the World Columbian 
Exposition. The spark from Cleveland’s magic button caused a fair that had for months lain 
dormant to suddenly spring into animated existence, sending geysers of water to a height of 
more than seventy feet. The 25,000 spectators in attendance reported hearing a great “clatter 
of machinery” all across the fairgrounds, which caused the crowd to cheer in unison. Since 
the stunning London Great Exposition in 1851, world’s fairs have used public spectacle to 
dazzle spectators and to attract large crowds to the fairgrounds. These public spectacles often 
commemorate some historical events. The opening of the Columbian fair in Chicago, for 
example, was intended to coincide with the 400-year anniversary of Columbus's discovery of 
the new world. The ceremony was in fact one year late of its historic deadline; however, even 
with these delays, the colossal buildings and overall grandeur of the fair captured the public’s 
imagination and helped communicate the status of the United States as a rising economic 
force. As Cleveland’s opening address asserted, “We stand today in the presence of the oldest 
nations of the world and point to the great achievements we here exhibit, asking no 
allowance on the score of youth” (“Columbian Exposition” 14). 
As inspirational as Cleveland’s words sounded to those in attendance, the country 
was far from universally in support of the historic day being celebrated by a sprawling 
Midwest city. East Coast newspapers, no doubt jealous that the honor was given to Chicago, 
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predicted a “cattle-show” in the “porkpolis” (Monroe 218). Compelled by an anxiety over 
Chicago’s provincial reputation, in addition to providing an answer to Paris’s Exposition 
Universelle, the organizers of the fair used a utopian White City to recast the image of their 
city as a flourishing civilization, reflecting the values and aesthetic of Western Europe. But 
worries over low attendance created a pressing need for something novel and exciting to 
generate public interest. Paris had three years earlier unveiled Eiffel’s colossal tower to the 
world. So the organizers would need to devise not only an argument for America’s 
sophistication but message that would match the novelty of Paris’s inventive and daring 
architectural experiment. As lead architect Daniel Burnham put it: Chicago needed 
something that would “out-Eiffel, Eiffel.”  
The answer to Burnham’s pressing dilemma would come from a young American 
bridge builder named George Ferris. Ferris’s proposal promised to create a truly 
transformative experience: a great wheel that would transport fairgoers high above the dingy 
streets of Chicago, carrying over 2,000 passengers at a time some 300 feet in the air inside 
carriages the size of streetcars. The movement and speed of the Great Ferris Wheel 
contrasted the unchanging architectural ideals of Burnham’s neoclassical faux structures of 
plaster and wood. While the civilizing power of the White City communicated American 
Victorian sensibilities or “high culture,” George Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel embodied its 
opposite: the spectacle of exposed steel and steam engine technology. 
One way to read the world’s fair, perhaps the one most easily adopted, is to see the 
exposition as a site of ideological domination, which manifests itself overarchingly in the 
visual repertoire of bourgeois representations of high culture. The growing literature on 
world expositions has focused on issues of representation, colonialism, and power. In this 
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analysis the ideological function of the exposition genre is to interpolate or inscribe audience 
into a conventional subject position. The role of expositions is to frame their subjects and 
define their social existence by assigning them a particular place in society. A good example 
of this kind of analysis is Robert Rydell’s discussion of the hegemonic function of the fair’s 
“symbolic universe.” The argument works well with the utopian artifacts that Rydell selects 
for his analysis; they are distinctly hierarchical and serve to legitimize racial dominance.  
To study the first is to study the bourgeois imagination, the institutional mechanism 
used to reform and regulate public values. But rhetoric calls for a reading of these events that 
also assesses their reception and response. As a quintessential dialogical discipline, the 
reception is our obsession and a statement is only half completed by itself; it needs its 
rejoinder to have cultural meaning. The general point I wish to make is that the exposition, 
not unlike other forms of public entertainment, is not a monolithic site of symbolic 
interpolation into conventional mores. It is also a space of actual people and places, a site 
easily obscured by agendas and established frameworks. Therefore, to gain some sense of 
how fairgoers both experienced and challenged the rhetoric of the World’s Columbian 
Exposition, this article examines the popular and public response to the fair. In other words, 
it examines the public sphere and its articulated response.  
To pursue this analytic agenda, I examine in detail both the Midway Plaisance and 
Ferris’s Pleasure Wheel as subversive spectacles seen through the eyes of actual fairgoers. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines spectacle as a “specially prepared or arranged display 
of a more or less public nature (esp. one on a large scale) forming an impressive or 
interesting show for those viewing it” (“Spectacle”). Given this definition, it is not surprising 
that the idea of spectacle is essentially linked to theatricality and, more specifically, to 
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stagecraft. Discussions of spectacle are not uncommon in theater studies, and some of these 
scholars locate the root of spectacle in Aristotle’s notion of opsis as found in Book VI of the 
Poetics (see, e.g., Carlson; Walton; Pavis). This article will unpack opsis as a concept that 
roughly translates as spectacle, and Aristotle’s brief discussion of it yields insight into how it 
might be refigured as a useful concept in contemporary rhetorical theory.  
In the following discussion I consider the concept of spectacle more closely, but I 
should affirm up front that Aristotle’s notion of opsis highlights one of the key claims that I 
develop. Spectacle, as a principle of stagecraft, may speak more loudly than plot, character, 
and script. Just as the backdrop for a theatrical dialogue can help to transport the audience, so 
a monumental rhetorical object can help to transport audience members to a place of wonder 
and, in the process, invite them to participate in redefining the rhetorical text.  
These grand spectacles were transformative in that they did more than just represent 
reality; they ruptured reality and enabled spectators to exercise the psychic force of their 
imagination. That is to say, spectacles, like Ferris’s Pleasure Wheel, were integral to what 
Gaston Bachelard called the “function of the unreal”: the rhetorical process of breaking free 
and creating the new (31). According to Bachelard’s Poetics of Space, the real and the unreal, 
the actual and the imaginary coexist, and “the imagination is ceaselessly imagining and 
enriching itself with new images” (32). The function of the unreal is to unlock the 
individual’s capacity to participate in defining what is real. The imagination is a place in 
which the individual is able to access remote regions where “memory and imagination 
remain associated, each working for their mutual deepening” (5).  
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The “Amusement Zone”  
At the World’s Columbian Exposition, the Amusement Zone (also called the Midway 
Plaisance) had numerous consequences on the fair’s reception. Like previous fairs, the Zone 
would bring a surge of working-class spectators and new understanding of the fair and its 
purpose. When the Amusement Zone for the Chicago fair was originally conceived by 
acclaimed Harvard anthropology professor Frederic W. Putman, it was intended to provide 
instruction on subjects such as ethnography and human development. The villages would 
give fairgoers a glimpse of Putnam’s “primitive societies,” a depiction that was no doubt in 
sharp contrast with the civilization narrative on display in the White City. Spectacles like 
Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show were summarily rejected from the Plaisance because 
they were not in keeping with its elevated tone. Thus, in its original inception the amusement 
zone would function to affirm the cultural message of the fair. But Putnam’s lack of 
showmanship and understanding of public interest forced fair officials to eventually hire a 
27-year-old impresario named Sol Bloom.  
Bloom’s approach was quite different from Putman’s and drew from his experiences 
at the famous Universelle in Paris where he learned to dramatize recent discoveries of 
indigenous cultures. Bloom used the dramatic to create exhibits that were more about 
character and display than archeological reality. Bloom states that he came to realize in the 
course of his preparations “that a tall, skinny chap from Arabia with a talent for swallowing 
swords expressed a culture which to me was on a higher plane than the one demonstrated by 
a group of earnest Swiss peasants who passed their day making cheese and milk chocolate” 
(qtd. in Patton 46). This departure from the ideals of Western Europe begins to communicate 
a very different rhetorical message than the one envisioned by Burnham and his associates.  
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The Amusement Zone in Chicago draws from and embellishes aspects of the Paris 
Amusement Zone and while it comes close to the Paris schema, it is not a direct 
reproduction: what made Chicago’s Amusement Zone different is that it existed separately 
from the rest of the exposition. It was a fair within a fair. Phil Patton describes this separation 
as a “motley set of entertainments encamped like Huns before Rome” (46). The whole of the 
fair occupied some 630 acres, but the Plaisance was only a strip of land running between 
59th street and 60th street, extending west from Stony Island to Cottage Grove Avenue. The 
goal of this separation was to distance the noise and distractions of the Amusement Zone 
from the “public education” going on in the celebrated “Court of Honor” and other state 
buildings.  
Organizers like G. Browne Goode and Wilbur Atwater highlighted the educational 
agenda of the fair—to guide humanity, to instruct the public in Victorian ideals. Goode, a 
Smithsonian official, explained the museum’s involvement: “Though the Museum 
undoubtedly loses much more than it gains on such occasions, the opportunity for popular 
education is too important to be neglected” (Rydell 7). Atwater, a politician from the 
Department of Agriculture, added this explanation: “The exposition should not be merely a 
show, a fair or a colossal shop, but also and pre-eminently an exposition of the principles 
which underlie our national and individual welfare, of our material, intellectual and moral 
status” (qtd. in Rydell 7). Both men argued for the fair’s role in elevating mankind, as a site 
of public education and an “exposition of principles.”  
The Amusement Zone in many ways stood in stark contrast to the cultural tenets that 
Goode and Atwater exposed. In addition to Bloom’s menagerie of sword swallowers and 
fire-dancing pigmies, the Plaisance contained magic shows like “The Houdini Brothers,” 
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replicas of distant lands, giant amusement rides, an ostrich farm, Hagenbecks’ animal side 
show, and an assortment of exotic villages and displays. “A Street of Cairo” and Ferris’s 
Great Pleasure Wheel were among the most visited sites at the Plaisance. One of Bloom’s 
primary attractions on the “Street of Cairo” was the “Algerian Dancers of Morocco” (See 
Figure 1).   
 
Danse Du Ventre 
Introducing Americans to the provocative danse du ventre (dance of the belly), 
Bloom’s dancing spectacle both intrigued and outraged Victorian audiences, producing a 
moral backlash: 
Fatima, the girl in blue, doesn’t prance up and down the 
stage, or go into mad gyrations, or try to kick a hole in 
the ceiling.  She keeps time in timid little steps, and 
occasionally sidles about the stage in slow, gliding 
circles.  It seems to be her pet ambition to disjoint 
herself at the hips, though a man in yesterday’s 
audience thought she was suffering from an overdose 
of green apples.  At any rate, her anatomy below the 
waist and the knees performs a series of violent 
tremors, spasms and contortions. (“Poetry of Motion” 
13) 
Figure 1: Known by her stage 
name “little Egypt,” a photo of 
Fahruda Manzar Spyropoulos 
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A heavy footed and heavy featured girl, who takes a few short, labored steps, snaps 
her fingers and accomplishes a muscular contortion not unlike that of the 
Newfoundland when, after a swim, he shakes his shaggy coat, is, to our eyes, an 
absurd and ugly spectacle. (“La Danse du Ventre” 2) 
When spectators returned with stories of Bloom’s danse du ventre, one of the first things that 
newspapers like The New York Herald did was to publish the reaction of those morally 
outraged: “It was downright indecent. I saw women go out after the creatures had begun what 
they call their dance.  I did not stay it through. I just couldn’t” (“Anthony is Shocked” 10).  A 
headline in Minnesota’s New Ulm Review read “ANTHONY WAS SHOCKED.” Anthony 
Comstock, a self-claimed moralist and censor, was a vocal critic of the dance, which he 
famously named the hoochie coochie. “To think of it,” said Comstock, “those young girls 
who were supposed to represent the essence of what is entertaining to some of those other 
southern countries—It is shocking! shocking!” Comstock believed that Bloom’s spectacle 
was a blemish on the magnificent fair. Echoing comments made by Goode and Atwater, 
Comstock said this of his experience watching the dance:  
the fair is magnificent and I was greatly impressed with its marvelous beauties and 
educational capabilities. After seeing what I saw no man with a conscience, no one 
with any love for the young and the innocent, no one who desires that our children 
shall grow up pure and undefiled…can rest while that vile sink of sensuality is in 
existence. (“Anthony is Shocked” 1) 
While attendance at the Plaisance actually increased as a result of Comstock’s review, for the 
fair officials, Comstock and other members of the Society for the Suppression of Vice 
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represented a significant problem. The reporter for the New Ulm Review said that a secret 
meeting was soon arranged between Comstock, several fair directors, and The Board of Lady 
Managers to address the issue. According to the article, the fair directors and the Lady 
Managers shared Comstock’s apprehension about the dance “and promised to purify the 
atmosphere of the Midway Plaisance” (“Anthony is Shocked” 2).  
The fair’s committee for decorum and modesty (The Lady Managers) decided to 
launch a full investigation of Bloom’s public spectacle. Mr. Debbas, the dancer’s manager, 
was frustrated by what he described as the Lady Managers’ duplicity, making the following 
complaint to The Philadelphia Inquirer: 
They go to the park and say my entertainment is vulgar. They say no good woman 
should countenance the dancing of my lovely girls. But they come again the next day 
and sit for hours in the best seats in my theatre and drink my coffee and applaud my 
dancers…  
Then they go out, and when they get to the entrance of my theatre they put into their 
looks disgust and outraged modesty. (“Mr. Debbas and the Lady Managers” 4) 
The dancers in Bloom’s show represented a stark contrast to the tightly corseted ladies of the 
Victorian age. For many, the danse du ventre was both morally reprehensible and slightly 
captivating. Michelle Harper explains that what fascinated Victorians most was  
the joy and freedom that count its expression in belly dance, which is mostly 
improvisational—very unlike the formalized steps of most dancing of the time. The 
direct gaze and uninhibited happy smile of the dancer was something fresh, 
unexpected, and frankly scandalizing to a society where the rules of decorum and 
modesty for women were firmly established. (“Hoochie Coochie”)  
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Harper explains how some women appreciated the dancers but were afraid to state their 
enjoyment publicly. On the one hand, the public spectacle of danse du ventre provided a 
unique and celebratory movement, an opportunity to free the body from the material 
restrictions that hinder expression. But on the other hand, Victorian ideals were in direct 
contrast to the exposed midriff and belly-dancing rhythm of the hoochie coochie.  
 
Ferris’s Great Wheel 
Another star attraction of the Plaisance was of course George Ferris’ Great Pleasure 
Wheel. When Ferris first introduced his idea of a 250-foot tall observation wheel, Burnham 
responded with deep concern: “Your wheel is so flimsy it would collapse, and even if it 
didn’t, the public would be afraid to ride in it.” (“George Ferris’ Engineering Marvel” 47). 
Ferris argued that the wheel would not collapse and that he understood his own trade. 
Eventually, Burnham agreed to present the idea to the board of directors, who subsequently 
approved the daring design, most likely because of time constraints. The Ferris wheel then 
became one of the most visited and profitable elements of the fair. Of the 20 million 
fairgoers, 1.45 million of them paid an additional 50 cents (same as the fair’s admission 
price) to see Chicago from a height greater than that of the Statue of Liberty. 
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Figure 2: From the Hyde Park Historical Society newsletter – “The Big Wheel”  
 
The first known American pleasure wheel is believed to be have been built over 30 years 
earlier, for the New York State fair, by Samuel Hurst and James Mulholland. Hurst and 
Mulholland constructed a four-armed revolving amusement ride with wooden buckets, a 
device that would transport four adults into the air rotating them around a central axis. 
Another attraction built by a Frenchman, Antonio Maquino, is said to have used a large 
wheel that was about 40 feet in diameter patterned after mill wheels. According to an article 
in The History of Atlanta and Its Pioneers, “so far as the principle of this novel device for 
entertainment is concerned, as perfected in the Ferris Wheel, Atlanta is at least forty years 
ahead of Chicago” (qtd. in Anderson 25). But perhaps the most obvious model preceding 
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Ferris’s invention was the Garden City Summer’s Observation Roundabout, built in 1891, on 
the boardwalk in Atlantic City. The ride bore the strongest resemblance to Ferris’s wheel; in 
fact, the Garden City Summer’s parent company sued Ferris for patent infringement. And 
yet, when you go to the fair you will ride a “Ferris wheel” and not a “Summer’s wheel.” So 
how did Ferris secure the cultural rights to such a lasting cultural icon?  
The sheer size of Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel certainly helps explain its legacy as 
an amusement ride and a cultural icon. While pleasure wheels existed prior to Ferris’s 
invention, and millions of subsequent Ferris wheels populate almost every American fair, the 
boldness of Ferris’s design is unparalleled. The amount of steel in motion was close to 1,800 
tons. It took two 1,000-horsepower steam engines to rotate the behemoth wheel around two 
140-foot towers. The Ferris wheel transported passengers over 260 feet in the air and could 
carry 2,160 people at a time. At night, 3,000 light bulbs attached to steel framework dazzled 
fairgoers at every juncture of the fair. Judith Adams asserts that although electricity made its 
debut at the 1877 exposition, it was not accepted nor considered safe. The Columbian fair 
used the fun of the Ferris Wheel to introduce the benefits of this new technology. The Ferris 
wheel and the movable walkway were ways in which the public explored the spectacle of 
electricity. Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel caused a stir of amazement, then, not only for those 
who rode on it but also for all those who witnessed its incandescent luminosity.  
The story behind the inception of the wheel and its design began in October 1890 at 
the Saturday Afternoon Club in Chicago, where Burnham is said to have rebuked a group of 
American civil engineers for their lack of creativity. After a few short introductory remarks, 
in which he praised his architect colleagues for their colossal buildings, Burnham turned his 
attention to the engineers in the room: “What’s wrong with you scientists? Haven’t you any 
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sense of the unique, of the off-beat on a grandiose scale? We must have something, anything, 
that will make a publicity splash all over the world” (“George Ferris Engineering Marvel” 
47). Burnham’s message was clear: For the fair to be successful, it needed something to 
dazzle the spectators, something “off-beat” and “unique,” something spectacular. The fair’s 
ability to attract large crowds depended on its ability to communicate novelty and evoke 
wonder in the audience.  
As Paul Greenhalgh comments in his study of world expositions, displaying scientific 
progress and technological advances had been a novelty during the first part of the century, 
but by the 1850s it had become so normal as to make the effort commonplace (41). 
Greenhalgh’s comment suggests, then, that fair organizers might feel pressed to satisfy the 
public’s immense appetite for the unexpected and unfamiliar. Burnham’s concerns were well 
justified. Some previous expositions had not supplied the necessary revenue to make the 
undertaking profitable. The 1873 Vienna exposition, for example, failed to draw sufficient 
crowds and as a result did not score well as a commercial investment.  
Burnham’s speech at The Saturday Afternoon Club was cleverly contrived to solicit 
an immediate reaction. Ideas quickly emerged from the group, including a recommendation 
for building a tower that would be 500 feet higher than the Eiffel Tower. In fact, Eiffel 
himself had submitted a similar design, a larger version of his wrought-iron triumph at the 
Paris Expo. But mere bigness would not produce the novelty so crucial to the success of a 
public spectacle, so the committee quickly rejected the idea. Other ideas replaced it, 
however. Burnham needed something to compete not only with the size of Eiffel’s creation 
but with its originality and daring design, something that would satisfy the public’s curiosity. 
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A distinctive feature that could arouse excitement and wonder would be an important 
criterion for selecting the winning design. 
Among the people in attendance that evening was a young engineer named George 
Ferris. Some popular accounts say that Ferris had written on the back of a napkin the original 
plans for a great observation wheel. So perfect was the sketch, said Ferris, that little was 
changed in the construction of the final design. The other engineers, perhaps jealous of 
Burnham’s selection, called the wheel “G.W.’s cockeyed dream.” Ferris would triumph over 
his critics, and the spectacle of his Great Pleasure Wheel, lauded by the press as a glorious 
triumph of American industry and skill, soon became one of the most prominent features of 
the fair.  
 
Opsis 
Before moving to my analysis, I want to affirm the role of the audience in such 
spectacles. To do so, I turn to Aristotle, who distinguishes spectacle, or opsis, from the other 
elements in a play (e.g., plot, character, script). But in doing so, he does not suggest that the 
concept is unimportant. He simply argues that, in relation to the other parts of a tragedy, it 
has the least to do with the poet. The poet must tell the story; he is not expected to design the 
set. In creating this distinction, Aristotle assigns opsis “an emotional attraction of its own” 
(64). That is, in recognizing that opsis is a concept independent of the poet, he also affirms 
that it effectively creates its own sort of appeal, or message. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not 
explicate this appeal because he is concerned with the poet and the plot, but by 
acknowledging the concept’s independence, he implies an invitation to consider more closely 
its role in moving the audience. Finally, Aristotle links the concept not to the actor, the 
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person seen, but to the “stage machinist,” the one behind the scenes, the invisible force that 
creates the landscape for social action (64). Whether he intends to or not, Aristotle indicates 
the remarkable power of opsis to invite the audience to participate and to view spectacle as a 
separate and distinct text.  
Coincidentally, Michael Halloran makes a roughly similar distinction in his 
discussion of spectacle, which he defines as “a public gathering of people who have come to 
witness some event and are self-consciously present to each other as well as to whatever it is 
that has brought them together” (5).  In witnessing the spectacle, the public sees itself 
differently. The observers (spectators) no longer exist as individuals but are part of a 
collective “reaction” to what is seen (6). Citing David Proctor, Halloran argues that spectacle 
occurs when “rhetors transform some event into enactment of their social order” (qtd. in 
Halloran 6). For Halloran, then, spectacle creates a body of rhetorical agents, a collective 
whose very presence alters the message of the text. “For every ‘Gettysburg Address’ or ‘I 
Have a Dream’,” Halloran claims, “there are hundreds of banal drones whose significance 
lies more in the fact and the circumstances of their delivery than in their texts” (15).  
In supporting this claim, Halloran recalls a scene from Forrest Gump in which the 
simpleton hero finds himself behind a microphone before tens of thousands of angry war 
protestors at the Washington Mall. As he begins to speak, an anti protestor disables the sound 
system. By the time the sound returns, Gump is concluding his remarks, yet he is 
congratulated because, as one protestor tells him, “You said it all, man.” So, in this example, 
the power of spectacle lies not with the speaker but with the audience and their collective 
response to the rhetorical situation. The emotional moment of the scene speaks through 
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Gump’s visual presentation. The script is meaningless. Audience, in this view, is not a mere 
constituent or a nonessential subsidiary of spectacle; it is the spectacle.  
 
Audience Response to the Fair: A Personal View 
This discussion expands on Aristotle’s and Halloran’s respective treatments of spectacle 
by offering a useful complication. Although both Aristotle and Halloran argue that spectacle 
(and, more broadly, any rhetoric of visual space and design that has implications for the 
audience) exists within an extra textual space, it need not be tied teleologically to the given 
script or performance. Halloran even suggests that the spectacle may, for all the audience 
knows, run counter to the script. The spectacle may speak more loudly. Free to exist 
separately from the script, visual rhetoric, and spectacle specifically, can be used to reorient 
or supplant a given script, so that spectators can imagine new possibilities and articulate a 
new story being told.1 That is, spectacle defined as empty theatrics is a pale reflection of a 
much more interesting and rich concept that includes the way in which the public expands 
the boundaries of the spectacle through their participation. But, one of the challenges of 
examining the audience’s role in expanding the script at the World’s Columbian Exposition 
is that those in attendance have all passed away, leaving only memories and written accounts 
of their experiences. I have recreated their stories here in the form of journal entries, 
interviews, and literary writing about the fair. These texts provide a glimpse of the fair 
experience from the point of view of those who witnessed it. 
 
                                                
1 This discussion of Opsis was originally submitted to Rhetoric Society Quarterly by authors Benjamin Crosby   
   and Jonathan Balzotti    
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Figure 3: View from the administrative building 
 
On August 10, 1893 The Princeton Union called the Ferris Wheel “a triumph of 
American Ingenuity.” Celebrating the wheel’s expression of modernity, the story portrays 
Ferris’s wheel as an example of “the idea of greatness” and “other characteristics of 
America” (“In Midway Plaisance” 1). It is only by first seeing the wheel—that is seeing the 
wheel on the Chicago skyline—that the White City is then made visible to each visitor who 
enters the gates. The wheel is not only an imposing figure on the skyline; it provides a vision 
from the ride itself, a view that creates important critical distance, separating fairgoers from 
an ordered labyrinth of towers and minarets in the celebrated Court of Honor and other 
administrative buildings. The view from the top of the wheel, reports The Princeton Union, is 
“a view never forgotten.” In either view, the wheel functioned as a disturbance through 
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which fairgoers reoriented themselves to the fair. The positionality allows fairgoers to reflect 
on the experience as a whole, what it means, how it relates to personal memory. Henry 
Adams rode the famous Ferris wheel “high above the milling crowds of the Midway 
Plaisance and delighted in the spectacle,…In the distance shimmered the pediments and 
domes of the White City.” The voice of “high culture” and Victorian America, Adams said 
the fair posed a provocative question for Americans to consider: “Chicago asked in 1893 for 
the first time the question whether the American people knew where they were driving” 
(Adams 343). Other voices provide further definition to the personal experience of fairgoers 
at the exposition in Chicago.  
One of these voices, an ordinary visitor to the fair, gives a written account of her visit 
in a letter to her younger sister Bertha. The author of the letter, Annie Lynch, a 27-year-old, 
unmarried woman from the Philadelphia area, was described by her family as “a very bright” 
young woman. Annie’s account indicates how middle-class Victorians might have talked 
about their experience at the fair. A few observations about her letter follow. 
Dear Bertha- 
Does not this [stationary] look extremely official? I think I shall tell you about today 
before yesterday, it has been so pleasant. We started out about 8:30 for breakfast and 
then immediately entered the fair grounds…Was very agreeably surprised at the 
interest this awakens. 
…all around the room were little tables to accommodate three persons where you 
were invited to sit down and have a cup of tea free of charge. We sat down and the 
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dignified Indian waiters in their cool, clean linen tunics and turbans brought us a 
quaint black tea pot full of tea after giving us a pretty china cup to drink from. We 
took our sandwiches and ate them and the whole was very enjoyable. I think I can 
hear C say- “She wouldn't drink tea at home.” This was exceptionally good and one 
half cream.  
 
Figure 4: First page of Annie’s letter to Bertha1 
 
 
Annie says she was “surprised at the interest” this experience “awakens” in her. She tells her 
younger sister that the day ended with the group of women eating French pastries on the side 
                                                
1 For a more comprehensive analysis of Annie’s letter to her sister see Marvin Nathan’s essay “Visiting the  
  World’s Columbian Exposition” 
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of the lake and watching fireworks. Describing her experience at the fair, Annie seems to 
radiate a sense of adventure, perhaps a bit of wonder—a reaction no doubt felt by others. Of 
course, those who visited the fair experienced some kind of awakening of the senses. The 
sheer size and novelty of the spectacle would be quite likely to stir their emotions and ignite 
their imaginations. But Annie’s first-hand account of her experience at the fair offers 
something else as well, a reaction that demonstrates participatory agency. In different parts of 
the letter, Annie provides her practical judgment about the different exhibits. Despite the 
grandiose intentions of fair organizers, she provides little reflection on the “ideal city” or on 
her own racial superiority. In fact, just the opposite is true. Annie’s account democratizes the 
spectacle and shows selectivity based on her tastes and personal interest: “I lay down on a big 
sleepy couch and dozed for an hour. Then I went up stairs after washing in the fine toilet. 
When we were put out we went on the lovely porch and sat in the wicker rockers until we felt 
like moving.” Her words clearly suggest that the fair allowed visitors the freedom to pursue 
their own ways of enjoying the fair without moralistic ruminations. Perhaps the “education” 
so important to the small number of fair organizers was far less important to the 21 million 
fairgoers such as Annie. 
While there are other accounts like Annie’s that offer scholars a penetrating view of 
the fair, few deal explicitly with the Ferris wheel as a new modern experience. But one of 
these accounts, written by Andrew Burgess, provides an enlightening description of how fair 
spectators might have responded to the sensation provided by Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel:   
This revolving a circle through the air up to 260 feet is a new sensation. It combines 
the gliding motion of the R.R. train and the upward jerk of an elevator. But does not 
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take away ones breath. There is nothing to cause a creepy sensation except when the 
car swings at the top in the down trip. Except for this cradle motion it is easy riding 
and the only fright comes from looking and noticing how far away the ground is and 
how small things look. We had a splendid view of the surrounding scenery....Some 
people get nauseous on the first trip, but generally enjoy the ride and wonder at the 
panorama which can be enjoyed from the Ferris Wheel.   
The perceived danger associated with riding such a large and unproven amusement ride is 
evident in Burgess’s account. He tells his readers that the “nauseous” or “creepy sensation” 
one might expect is actually not felt by most riders and that the only issue regarding the 
sensation of riding the wheel is a kind of “cradle motion” experienced on the downward 
plunge.  
 To help his readers understand the sensation of riding 260 feet into the atmosphere, 
Burgess draws from his modern-life experiences, his memories of riding the train and being 
lifted in the elevator. These personal memories serve not only as means by which Burgess 
recounts his experience for others but as important examples through which he makes sense 
of the experience for himself. To say this another way, Burgess must draw from his own 
experiences and use his imagination in order to articulate those experiences that have not yet 
been defined for him. The “gliding motion of the R.R. train” and the “upward jerk” of the 
elevator are no doubt familiar sensations. Through his imaginative prose, Burgess creates a 
bond between writer and reader, a bond perhaps formed by other fairgoers in conversations 
inside and outside the fairgrounds. These shared experiences and memories, drawn from 
modern life, work to define the Ferris spectacle and thus help to define its cultural 
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significance. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Ferris and other fair 
organizers to anticipate what package of personal memories that Annie or Burgess would 
draw on to explain their experience of the fair. And as such, both Annie and Burgess help to 
construct public interpretation of the Ferris spectacle. 
 The individual accounts all help to contest the educational message of the fair. The 
larger cultural agenda of perfecting the masses is nowhere evident in either Burgess’s or 
Annie’s account. Both writers use familiarities drawn from personal experience to describe 
what is unfamiliar and new. Through their participation, these fairgoers work to redefine the 
public spectacle of the Columbian exposition—to complete the rhetorical text—and in so 
doing, create an altogether different spectacle. The audience’s experience in the case of 
Ferris’s wheel speaks more loudly than—or at least independently of—the script. My goal 
here has been to reveal how the material object speaks in light of, and in spite of, the political 
scripts from which it emerged. As Blair and Michel point out, “sometimes what appears to be 
the rhetorical text is not the rhetorical text, but an altogether different one.” And “what 
counts as the text is open to question” (38, 39).  
 
Conclusion 
Public entertainment, even in the case of a large state-run exposition, is rarely (if 
ever) so one dimensional as to enable only one reading of, or point of view on, its subject 
matter. Great exhibitions can give visual expression to the political ambitions of the nation-
state. They symbolize national prestige: helping the host nation to further an imperialist 
agenda based on global expansion. But unlike other symbols of national pride, such as 
monuments and memorials, the great exhibitions of the 19thcentury were temporary 
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expressions, lasting only brief moments. I have argued that expositions can provide as many 
options for creating meaning in a participatory sense as they can for experiencing public 
education in a normative sense. I have focused on the concept of spectacle to demonstrate 
that public entertainment contains several subject positionings. I am able to discuss these 
positionings precisely because Ferris’s Great Pleasure Wheel makes them available for 
reflection and interpretation.  
Ferris intended for his idea to promote a national education agenda, to elevate 
mankind. But his contribution did not find its way into many educational venues. Rather, 
Ferris’s contribution to society is located mostly in America’s fairgrounds and amusement 
parks. So, although Ferris hoped his wheel would be remembered as Ferris’s Observation 
Wheel, it is now more commonly referred to as a symbol of public entertainment, or a 
pleasure wheel. Thus, not only is the spectacle of the Ferris wheel created for a particular 
purpose, but it is also reformed and redefined by the participants’ responses, whether 
personal or public. 
Public entertainment, I contend, is inherently a participatory space, replete with 
alternative interpretations and audience involvement. Working within this participatory space 
in rhetorical scholarship can enrich our understanding of the public’s role in articulating 
perceptions of culture and the idealistic quest for our imaginary community. The World’s 
Columbian Exposition as a case study enables rhetorical scholars to explore a powerful 
moment of cultural transformation in the 19thcentury through the spectacle of new 
technologies and dazzling displays of human achievement. The exposition introduces the 
audience to possibilities of an undefined future. It is precisely this capacity of rhetorical 
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objects to rupture the status quo that can account for their central role in helping to create a 
transformative moment for those present.  
From this perspective, spectators are never wholly imposed upon by a singular 
message, and in the example of Bloom’s Midway Plaisance, spectacle offers opportunities to 
resist the imposition of Victorian ideals. In the case of Burnham’s White City, the 
educational model was precisely the mechanism through which fair organizers tried to 
impose a singular vision of American ideals. Instead, rearticulating the display of exotic 
cultures and creating colossal edifices of public entertainment the public spectacle of the 
Plaisance enabled fairgoers to fashion interpretations of their own making. Burnham’s White 
City might have imposed a bourgeois imagination on fairgoers, but through the disruptive 
qualities of Bloom’s spectacle, the Midway Plaisance also provided fairgoers the opportunity 
to construct a public memory of the fair. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: REPRESENTING IKE: SPECTACLE, MEMORY, AND THE 
RHETORIC OF COMTEMPORARY MEMORIALS 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay develops a reading of Frank Gehry’s proposed Eisenhower memorial to 
interrogate and discuss how some contemporary memorials use rhetorical staging to create 
what Della Polloch calls the pseudo-modern texts, a text that creates opportunities for 
socially constructed meaning, encouraging audience participation and reflection. As a 
pseudo-modernist text, Gehry’s proposed design does more than “critique” the practice of 
memorialization. It combines a strategy I call “narrative collage” with bigness to captivate 
and then invite spectators to organize the different elements of the composition, forming their 
own memory of Eisenhower. I wish to argue that contemporary monument design, as 
demonstrated by Gehry, has the potential to break from conventional memorial practices in 
ways that encourage audience members to begin constructing a more self-directed and 
democratic public memory.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Sole researcher and author. 
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…theorizing memory was a crucial tool for determining the ‘‘objective’’ or ‘‘subjective’’ status of personal 
and cultural knowledge as well how human desires and beliefs emerge or are installed within humans. 
 
    -Jeff Pruchnic 
 
Introduction 
On March 25, 2010, the federal Eisenhower Memorial Commission awarded 
architect Frank Gehry the opportunity to memorialize America’s most popular WWII 
hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower. But the controversial design has provoked harsh criticism 
from the Eisenhower family and from Republican lawmakers. Senator Rob Bishop from 
Utah proposed a bill to eliminate congressional funding for the Gehry design: “Our goal 
should be to do what is right by President Eisenhower and to do it the right way” 
(“Criticism Barrage” 1). Congress told the Memorial Commission that they would block 
any construction of the memorial until the commission could show they have adequately 
worked “with all constituencies—including Congress and the Eisenhower family—as 
partners in the planning and design process.” Bruce Cole, a member of the Memorial 
Commission, has stated publicly that the Gehry design is currently “on life support” 
(“Criticism Barrage” 2).  
Controversies surrounding the memorial’s design have escalated since 2012, turning 
into a cultural debate about post-modernism versus traditionalism; the purpose of memorials 
in the 21st century; and the general aesthetics of the D.C. National Mall. Susan Eisenhower, 
the granddaughter of Ike, has come to symbolize her family’s strong objection to the Gehry 
design. At a Senate subcommittee meeting in 2013, Ms. Eisenhower denounced Gehry’s 
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design as too “grandiose” and not keeping with the nation’s memory of her grandfather 
(“Interview with Susan Eisenhower”). In her speech to the subcommittee she compares the 
giant metal tapestries of Gehry’s design to the metal fences of Adolf Hitler’s death camps 
and the colossal limestone columns to Soviet missile silos. Her intent is made clear by the 
references to Nazi Germany. Ms. Eisenhower, and most of the Eisenhower family, have 
requested a formal review of the Commission’s use of public funds and a complete redesign 
of the memorial.   
Incendiary as Susan’s portrayal may have been, the comparison between Gehry’s Big 
Rhetoric design and Hitler’s death camps is ineffectual. Quite the opposite is true. Gehry’s 
design might draw from western traditions of grandiosity to garner a strong emotional 
reaction, but the method by which Gehry uses Big Rhetoric ensures that neither author nor 
memorial defines the public memory of Eisenhower. Rather, Gehry uses a narrative 
collage—a term I will define below—to invite audience participation, to bid the viewer to 
fashion for themselves a memory of Ike of their own making.  
The memorial is planned to be built on a four-acre plot south of Independence 
Avenue. The primary elements of the memorial include 13 80-foot tall limestone columns, 
oak trees, a series of monolithic stone blocks, a stature of Eisenhower as a young boy, and 
two rows of perforated metal screens (also referred in this essay as metal tapestries). The 
towering columns support the metal screens, images of Abilene printed across the surface 
like a black and white film.   
My method for mining Gehry’s design for this new approach to memorialization is 
circumspective and limited, given the memorial is still in the design phase. But my analysis 
is influenced by a fusion of scholars working to understand public memory; more precisely 
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said, my method is derived primarily from what many rhetorical scholars have contributed to 
our understanding of public memory and its relationship to the built environment. While each 
of these scholars shares a common understanding of public memory, with the rhetorical 
practices that entails, they each contribute a unique element to my interpretive pool.  
Art historian Rudolf Fuchs addresses what he calls the “collective dream” of 
memorials, a dream that “is never just an absolutist gesture by a ruling class towards its 
subjects. It also reflects how a people or a community wishes to see itself – a collective 
dream on a national fulfillment and honour” (97). Fuchs’ “collective dream” places the text 
and audience in an interactive dialogue. The audience desires a positive national-self image, 
and the memorials must communicate that positive self-image, or risk being considered 
obsolete by the community. Therefore, a memorial’s ability to speak to the community 
requires some attention to those things the community deems important. Stephen Browne 
notes how public memory must account for the social “aspiration” of the public and explains 
that the most important function of the monument or memorial is to “fix collective identity in 
the present.” It does so by distributing and in some cases repurposing symbolic resources 
(201). 
Memorials, like monuments, are symbolic resources rooted in the past and define 
ways in which particular people and events intersect with broader configurations of culture 
and politics. Browne argues these public memory texts are “fashioned from the symbolic 
resources of community and subject to its particular history, hierarchies, and aspirations” 
(248). In a similar vein, Clifford Geertz argues that humans need these symbolic “sources of 
illumination” to find their place in the community (45). Monuments, memorials, and public 
art are all good examples of memory devices, using particular symbolic approaches to 
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“fashion” public memory. The craft of making public memory, then, is a rhetorical one. It 
ties particular political aspirations to material, symbolic expressions. Shared memory, or 
public memory, requires affective expressions that join political power with the more finite 
material world. Together, the memory and material structure become Geertz’s source of 
“illumination,” directing people towards ideologies and forming links between institutions 
and people. As many memory scholars have noted, public texts such as these often benefit 
some groups and not others.  
One problem with these memorial practices is that they are organized by a single 
storyteller, a history-telling approach that promotes a particular vision for a particular 
institution. Maurice Halbwachs maintains that symbolic resources, distributed by social 
institutions, construct a particular collective memory and thus highlight an institutionalizing 
process of collective identification. The problem with this approach is that memory and 
forgetting are co-constitutive processes: each is essential for the other’s existence. Therefore, 
rhetorical scholars should be aware that when collective memories are drawn from “symbolic 
resources” they require some process of excluding individual, lived experience. The 
memorial, in this case, becomes a tool for selectivity and partiality. For rhetoricians, this 
focus on public memory has led some to ask why some events are being remembered and 
why others are being forgotten.  
Fuchs’ framework concerns itself with the desires of the whole community, a national 
dream waiting to be realized in material form. Browne’s use of public memory contributes 
the idea that memorials are tied to the communities that operate around them, a point 
Halbwachs advances by examining the ways certain social institutions help communities to 
disregard individual lived experiences. Out of these three main ideas on memorialization 
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comes the most useful way of critically examining Gehry’s design and its potential for a 
more democratic history-telling approach.   
 
Gehry’s Design 
Representations of Eisenhower often portray 
him as the stalwart general or heroic leader of 
Allied forces, as seen in Figure 1. The statue at 
West Point, one of the most recognizable depictions 
of the famous general, stands perched atop a 
pedestal of red granite. For this project the artist 
Donald Delue used one of Eisenhower’s actual 
uniforms supplied by Eisenhower’s son to cast the 
mold for the bronze statue. The role of the public 
monument in defining the general-president’s 
legacy is a subject that has been considered central 
in the debate between the traditionalists and 
modernists. The memory of Eisenhower is not 
simply a memory of an individual whose life and 
history had some relevance at a particular time. Eisenhower was one of the most popular 
presidents the United States has ever elected. As historian Garry Wills explained, “…he 
remained, year after year, the most respected man in America” (118). 
Returning from Germany laden with decorations and medals, Eisenhower is said to 
have told his fellow countrymen, “The proudest thing I can claim is that I am from Abilene” 
Fig. 1 Eisenhower’s monument  
at West Point, New York 
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(“Homecoming Speech”). Eisenhower’s immense popularity lay in his background and his 
pride in 19th century agricultural America. Growing up in an undistinguished Midwest town, 
the son of a pacifist, Eisenhower exemplified the homespun virtues many Americans 
idealized. The statue of Eisenhower as a young boy sits inside an enclosure surrounded by 
images of his hometown Abilene, Kansas. The statue of the young Eisenhower was inspired, 
says Gehry, by a childhood photograph of the President and by a homecoming speech in 
which Eisenhower recalls his days as a “barefoot boy in Kansas.” Critics of the Gehry design 
deride the boy-statue as misrepresenting the leadership and authority of the great president-
general.  
 
 
Figure 2.  The proposed Eisenhower monument seen from the DOE building 
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Figure 3.  The monument seen from the D.C. Mall 
 
 
One of the most prominent features of the Gehry design is the trees that dominate the 
memory landscape. The trees obscure other elements within the memorial, forcing spectators 
to explore the memorial one section at a time. The placement of green elements creates a 
contrast between Gehry’s design and the Mall. Thus, the significance of the park, and its 
connotations, complicate the traditional memorial, adding associations of unbridled nature, 
or, quite simply, the wilderness as our past. Nature blocks the viewer’s ability to organize the 
memory landscape and in so doing contrasts the ordered concrete buildings that populate the 
D.C. Mall.  
In the material sense, the Gehry design, as a symbol, can both represent the idea of 
Eisenhower and, because it is a park (a green space), an experiential function to be used as a 
place of rest and relaxation. However, as Geoffrey Broadbent explains, “architecture is not 
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only the signifier of some abstract meaning, but is itself the signified of some pervading 
philosophy” (387). Moving from signifier to signified the memorial becomes more than a 
representation of Ike, it becomes a new opportunity to craft a public memory of Ike. But the 
memory of the general-president is vague and somewhat obscure, it resists our desire to fix a 
particular image of Eisenhower in our minds; even the relationship between the different 
elements of the composition is unclear. The invitation therefore is to explore the relationship 
between these three separate moments in history, starting with the question posed by the 
“barefoot boy from Kansas.” What experiences caused this small boy to rise to the highest 
office in the United States? Gehry talks about how the photo of the young president camping 
along the Smoky Hill River in 1904 was inspiration for the memorial’s design as a whole 
(See appendix A).  
Surrounding the park and the boy are the large metal woven tapestries that dominate 
the composition. As mentioned above, the tapestries depict Abilene, Kansas, and the 
Midwest landscape. In depictions of Gehry’s design above, the transparency of the tapestries 
allows the buildings behind to permeate the viewer’s experience. The contrasting elements of 
steel + holes separately indicate their use, and taken together communicate a past connected 
to a material present. The use of these elements in the memorial calls for a process of 
remembering that is always located in the present, always situated alongside the institutions 
that work to govern our memory of the past. The Gehry design exposes Browne’s point that 
these representations are always connected to cultural institutions of power. While the steel 
tapestries appear to critique public memory, they also celebrate an agrarian past, depicting a 
Midwest farmhouse on the fertile prairie, giving the whole monument an epideictic feel 
rather than ironic. And so Gerhy’s design both critiques and celebrates an American past.   
 88 
The cinematic feel to the tapestries also suggests a process of remembering 
influenced by modern technologies. Eisenhower’s boyhood memories are broken at intervals 
by the columns, each image is cast as a scene in a larger cinematic real. The tapestries invite 
the question of how future presidents might experience the past with the digital tools of the 
present? How might our own memories of the past be constructed and displayed by the tools 
we use to tell stories in the present? The alphabetic elements of the memorial are situated 
behind the visual elements—the boy sculpture, relief of present Eisenhower, the relief of 
general Eisenhower—all provide a visual triptych of meaning.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Eisenhower triptych 
 
Figure 5.  Design concept 
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The triptych was predominantly used in the Middle Ages to display multi-panel works of art 
in Catholic churches. The works could be folded easily and then relocated when necessary. In 
the Eisenhower monument, the spectator is invited to explore the relationship of the three 
visual items as they relate to the ideas situated behind them in the written text. Once again, 
the audience is challenged not to fix a particular image of Eisenhower but to begin a process 
of piecing together different moments of the subject’s life and in so doing to create a self-
directed memory of Eisenhower.  
The invitation for the spectator to draw connections is repeated throughout the 
monument and becomes a central motif of the Gehry design. By locating Eisenhower’s 
speeches behind the triptych, the audience is invited to contemplate the relationship between 
language and memory, between image and sound. The open front of the monument faces the 
capital building, highlighting a political process that continues even while the spectator tries 
to make sense of the past. A final question emerges: how has the political process in 
Washington been changed because of Eisenhower’s experiences, his words, and his actions?  
The monument resists answering these questions and instead invites the viewer to 
experience the juxstapositioning of those ideas and make their own determinations within the 
distributed design. In contrast to the image of Eisenhower at West point, the standing 
general, Gehry’s dynamic design has no central figure, no heroic image to stabilize the 
public’s memory of Eisenhower. The dynamic design uses instead the tree filled square 
bordered by columns to provide the spectator an opportunity to both experience the past and 
construct a self-directed memory of the dead president. Nowhere in the memorial is there a 
single point of emphasis. The columns and tapestries use their impressive height to surround 
the sculptures, but once inside the viewer sees mostly the trees, an element of the 
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composition that helps to obscure both column and tapestry. The rewards of experiencing the 
Eisenhower memorial might be increased further if the audience enters that space having 
done some research, bringing along stories and visions of the general-president that help 
contextualize the memorial. 
The contrast to other monuments is a form of disturbance, a disconnection from the 
language-system of the Mall, a new architectural aesthetic that stands apart from the ordered, 
concrete space of the Mall. The Gehry design operates independent of its context, and yet 
merges with the Mall as a new symbolic system. Its walls are permeated with the buildings 
that communicate government and bureaucracy. 
 
The Post-Post Modern Memorial 
Nations and their leaders are often memorialized for two reasons: first, to celebrate by 
artifice the actions of a national figure; and second, to establish through symbols the state’s 
political power. But a historical legacy of this sort is less bounded by state-sponsored 
propaganda than might first appear. A person’s life is a momentary event in history, limited 
in time and space, and as time passes the public’s memory of that person becomes fuzzy, as 
pressing concerns govern our attention and leave little room for remembering the distant past. 
Thus for presidents to be more than dead statesmen, their memory must be presented to the 
public in some material form; they must hang on the walls of elementary school classrooms; 
they must stand as statues in public parks; a tenuous link must be forged between the 
memory of the statesman and a symbolic, material manifestation.  
At the heart of this link is the rhetorical text, a text that promotes psychological and 
mental coherence, or group identification, and unlike other architectural designs that may 
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serve to reinforce culture but lack the persuasive power to actively shape it, monuments and 
memorials are persuasive agents that actively shape the conversation. Otherwise put, they 
actively work to affirm beliefs about the institutions they come to represent. Chaim 
Perelman’s definition of epideictic discourse helps reveal the memorial’s rhetorical nature: 
The speaker engaged in epideictic discourse is very close to being an educator. Since 
what he is going to say does not arouse controversy, since no immediate practical 
interest is ever involved, and there is no question of attacking or defending, but 
simply of promoting values that are shared in the community . . .” (52).  
If we may call the discourse of memorials and monuments epideictic, then we can surmise 
that for these rhetorical texts to shape group identification they must promote shared values 
while not arousing too much controversy.  
The primary difference between monuments and memorials is their subject matter. 
The monument is typically used to honor a particular individual or to celebrate what one 
group deems a significant event. The Arc de Triumph stands in the Place Charles de Gaulle 
to celebrate the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. However, memorials often 
remind their audiences of loss—for example the World Trade Center memorial or the Titanic 
Wreckage memorial. Interestingly, the Eisenhower text is called a memorial, not a 
monument, leading to speculation about its intention as a public text. The implications of this 
naming are significant and help express the rhetorical goals of Gerhy and the committee.  
In the case of traditional monuments and memorials, rhetorical criticism has been 
deployed for the purpose of uncovering hegemonic practices to address the hidden message 
located within the text and how that message constrains the spectator’s capacity to use 
personal judgment to recall images of the past in the present. In the case of Diocletian’s 
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column, I argued the monument could be used to align disparate groups with a larger, 
dominant hegemonic power. But if the goal is to maintain a critical mode of being, rather 
than a representational one, a new breed of memory text is needed, one that employs a 
system of references that use a range of rhetorical strategies to place the past in the present 
but that also resists stabilizing a particular version of the past. One aim of this paper, then, is 
to explore the ways in which the Gehry design accomplishes some of these objectives. 
The post-modern text, in contrast to its more traditional counterparts, challenges 
notions of stability by dismantling known symbolic referents. These texts appear to use both 
cognitive and sensory experience to loosen the anchor of the signifier and signified and 
create what post-modern theorist’s call the “floating signifier, a signifier that does not point 
to a particular object or agreed upon meaning.” James Young in his book, Memory’s Edge, 
recommends, as many other post-modern theorists have, that alternative practices of 
commemorating be explored for their ability to resist static interpretations that lead to 
hegemonic practices. 
Barbara Biesecker, Carole Blair Bodnar, J. Bodnar, and Greg Dickinson have all 
written extensively on how many American memorials serve to construct a national narrative 
of the past. Many of these scholars have worked to expose our problematic relationship with 
the past and in some cases (for an example see Blair’s essay on Maya Lin’s Vietnam 
memorial) argue for counter-rhetorical-strategies that work to escape the problems of 
hegemony. Young calls these commemorative practices “counter-monuments,” and Anne 
Daly uses the term “anti-monuments,” because the artifact explicitly attacks known cultural 
symbols that promote singularity and perpetuate cultural dominance. These anti-monuments 
and memorials use persuasive means to generate a “critical moment” for the audience, a 
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moment of reflection and critique. But the post-modern text often works in absence rather 
than subsistence, which is to say they remove the political cultural symbols and replace them 
with abstract ones. This absence can provide a critical moment for the individual but can also 
strip monuments and memorials of their rhetorical potential to create community coherence. 
Commemorative practices, like the artifact I’ve included for this analysis, point to 
something more than a moment of critique. These post-post-modern texts, or as Della 
Polloch calls them pseudo-modern texts, create an opportunity for socially constructed 
meaning that promotes group participation and interactivity rather than individual criticism; 
they use symbolic referents located within the culture (without irony) to generate a political 
power for the collective. In my analysis of Eisenhower’s design I suggest that the pseudo-
modernistic text, the post-post modern text, moves beyond the critical reflective moment, 
beyond deconstruction, and begins a process of reconstruction.  
Gehry’s Eisenhower design represents a unique bifurcation of the two extremes of 
modernism and post-modernism. While the Eisenhower memorial design utilizes many of the 
rhetorical practices of the modern memorial—grandiosity, permanence, spectacle—
Eisenhower’s memorial locates those strategies in a narrative collage of cultural objects that 
invite spectators to join in the process of constructing public memory. I define the narrative 
collage as an assemblage of compositions elements that like their post-modern ancestors 
resist agreed upon referent. The collage approach allows for an interactive text, a rizomatic 
structure, with no identifiable central axis to fix meaning. Instead, the elements of the collage 
are distributed almost at random to allow the audience to participate in constructing their 
memory of the person or event. To attempt a standard unified reading of the collage is to 
miss the point. The text offers a multitude of readings, sometimes even conflicting readings. 
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By inviting the audience to author their own experience with the collage, authorial intention 
becomes negligible. More is required of the audience in the Gehry design if the audience is to 
make sense of the symbols within the collage. However, the memory of the past can still be 
somewhat redemptive or inspiration in this approach.  
The traditional monument, in constrast, is designed to fix a narrative of the past for 
future generations. Such psychological and mental coherence, or group identification, is not a 
result of a particular persuasive rhetorical agent but is instead intentionally promoted by the 
community or seat of government for a particular purpose. Non monuments, in contrast, 
challenge notions of stability by dismantling known symbolic referents (as discussed above). 
In my analysis of different memorials and monuments I suggest the pseudo-modernistic text, 
Gehry’s narrative collage, moves beyond the critical reflective moment, beyond de-
construction, and begins a process of re-construction.  
The use of different cultural references celebrates the audience’s role in creating the 
memory of the historical figure, and the design democratizes the process of history-telling 
(Figure 6).  
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   Figure 6.  Inside the Eisenhower monument seen from the south entrance  
 
The range of signs we can manage, says Geertz, defines the “intellectual, emotional, and 
moral space within which we live” (77). If meaning is made socially, which is to say that 
meaning in the form of interpretable signs is constructed by communities of discourse 
through things like monuments and memorials, then the problems with our memory of the 
past surfaces, in part, because of our limited range of communicative signs, restricting our 
ability to imagine other worldviews. By rearticulating the memory texts at the D.C. Mall, 
these habits of remembering are challenged: the design distributes images, speeches, and 
statues in an assemblage of seemingly random places, separated by greenery and jagged 
walkways. The participation of the community is required to make sense of the parts and how 
they relate to the whole. At the heart of Gehry’s design is the distribution of different 
elements in what can only be described as an assemblage of independent parts. 
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Public Response 
 
In a recent interview by “Focus Washington,” Susan Eisenhower explained why her 
family opposed the monument. She believed the monument failed to capture “the memory of 
her grandfather.” The monument does not depict a man who “liberated Europe” or “freed 
Europe from tyranny,” says Ms. Eisenhower. Instead it depicts a “barefoot-boy from Abilene, 
Kansas” (“Interview with Susan Eisenhower”). Ms. Eisenhower’s comments highlight her 
personal memories of her grandfather, memories of heroic battles, and of a conservative 
president and not of a poor boy living in an unremarkable midwestern town.  
In support of Congressman Bishop’s “Memorial Completion Act,” Susan and her 
family testified before Congress on March 19th, 2013. At the beginning of her testimony, she 
argues a separation must be made between Gehry’s proposed design and the memorial 
project: 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, 
…From the moment the current design was adopted, some members of the 
Commission and the staff were determined to link the proposed Frank Gehry design 
to the very future of the memorial itself. This is unprecedented in the history of 
presidential memorials. This rigidity has damaged the effort to build a memorial. The 
approach has made adversaries out of stakeholders and alienated even the greatest 
supporters of this process. 
Ms. Eisenhower’s first complaint is the “unprecedented” approach of the Memorial 
Commission: they have unfairly linked the winning design of the memorial competition, the 
Gehry’s design, to the memorial project itself. This decision has alienated “stakeholders” 
who saw the Gehry design as too “post-modern.” It is not clear who the “stakeholders” are to 
which Ms. Eisenhower refers, but given her testimony, we can assume she is chosen to speak 
on their behalf. Ms. Eisenhower uses the term “significant stakeholders” throughout her 
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testimony and says that this group deems the Gehry design “regretfully, unworkable.” The 
primary complaint of the stakeholder group, according to Ms. Eisenhower, is that “the design 
is flawed in concept.” She goes on to explain how: the design is “overreaching in scale” and 
the “durability” of the “metal scrims (metal tapestries) is questionable.” She continues her 
attack by questioning the Commission’s prudence: “despite all this, the Commission’s 
approach is to plow ahead with a design that has virtually no support outside of a percentage 
of the architectural community—which has understandably rallied more in defense of 
architect Frank Gehry than for the specific memorial design itself.”  
In addition to Susan Eisenhower’s testimony before Congress, the subcommittee also 
received criticism made by independent, traditional architects who claimed the Gehry’s 
design has a post-modern feel that “so often characterizes Gehry’s work.” The National Civic 
Art Society (NCAS), a non-profit organization dedicated to the restoration of the classical 
tradition “to its rightful primacy in our nation’s capital,” has devoted considerable resources 
in opposing the Gehry’s design. The group denounced the design’s “avent-garde” feel, and in 
a 154-page report criticizes Gehry for his associations with Jazz musician Robert Wilson and 
sculpture Charles Ray. Wilson was deprecated in the report for “tampering with Shakespere’s 
Hamlet” and Charles Ray, according to the report, for “sexualizing children” (Kennicott, 
“Opposition”). Raul M. Grijalva, one of the Democratic members of the subcommittee, 
responded to the culture war waged by both Ms. Eisenhower and the NCAS by stating that he 
did not think the subcommittee, or “the full committee, or Congress is the appropriate place 
to litigate a memorial design or a potential family dispute.” The senator’s comments attempt 
to distance the process of building memorials from public discussion and criticism. The 
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report issued by the NCAS has since been used by a number of conservative columnists and 
critics to denounce the Gehry design (Kennicott, “Opposition”). 
Ms. Eisenhower’s criticism of the design in many ways is accurate; the spectacle of 
the monument is used to diminish the central figure in favor of a much larger but less certain 
idea. Eisenhower’s complaints highlight some of the key differences between the Gehry 
design and previous Eisenhower memory texts. Although the memorial contains a large sans 
relief of the general speaking with troops in Europe, the relief and the rest of the memorial do 
not appear to communicate the primacy of Eisenhower. Ms. Eisenhower claims the size and 
spectacle of the 80-foot tall metal tapestries dwarf the image of her grandfather, and in so 
doing render him small and insignificant. At the end of the interview, Ms. Eisenhower said 
she would prefer something “simple” and “welcoming.” When asked by the interviewer what 
her design might look like, she replied: it would look like “freedom,” and ended the 
interview by saying her grandfather was about “freedom.” Many commenters on the 
Washington Post website responded to Ms. Eisenhower’s interview. Most of the comments 
agreed the Gehry‘s design was “overstated” and “grandiose.” Jfschumaker wrote:  
Eisenhower was a modest, conventional man, and he needs a modest, conventional 
monument, like the tasteful and restrained monument to him in London. Socialist 
Realist tableaus have no place in Washington, and are entirely inappropriate to mark 
the life of this great American. 
 
Jfschumaker’s complaint points to a particular memory of Eisenhower, a memory not 
communicated by the “Socialist Realist tableaus” in the Gehry proposal. The post by 
Jfschumaker is interesting for two reasons: first, it argues for the correct memory of 
Eisenhower, one reducible to certain abstract characteristics that represent what are important 
to the poster and thus important to the larger community. Second, it says these ideals are 
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nowhere in the Gehry design. The design is characterized by both Ms. Eisenhower and the 
poster as “grandiose” and “unrestrained.” ConventiGlenB27 agreed with Jfschumaker and 
says that “our best memorials are small, or understated neo-Classical Greek and Roman 
Republic.” Both posters argue for a corrective aesthetic, one that stays true to what it means 
to be American. The correct view is a “neo-Classical Greek and Roman Republic.” It might 
be hard to see Rome as an “understated” aesthetic, but the post nevertheless advocates for a 
more conservative design for the president.  
Fuchs’ point about the “collective dream” can be seen within these commentator’s 
response to Ms. Eisenhower. The monument proposed by Gehry does not promote their 
singular vision of Eisenhower imagined by a particular political party. In fact, it works 
actively to resist a simple interpretation of Eisenhower. And instead, it presupposes that the 
audience negotiates an interpretation of their own, perhaps one they did not anticipate 
having. The comments on the Washington Post website criticize the Gehry design for not 
providing a simple representation. MayHem1 wrote that Gehry’s design is an example of the 
“emperor’s new clothes” (Kennicott, “Opposition”). Very few of the responses disagreed 
with Ms. Eisenhower, but a few asked for restraint as some comments became aggressively 
personal towards Gehry. The three posts I’ve highlighted were voted the top comments by 
other bloggers and reflect the call for a “simple,” more “traditional” rendering of 
Eisenhower.  
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Conclusion 
 
To approach the memorial requires identifying useful rhetorical theory that can 
provide an instructional account of the memorial’s unique method for delivering content to 
the audience. Thus this test and assessment of public memory does not only provide analyses 
for the Gehry design, but can be used when other pseudo-modernist texts are examined for 
their ability to redefine traditional memory practices. I posit that these objects are actors 
situated in exigencies that motivate both what is spoken and what is heard. There are, 
therefore, many possibilities of employing rhetoric as a heuristic to render contemporary 
memorial practices as dynamic messages with surrounding circumstances.  
Interestingly, but not surprising, the public has reacted to the Gehry design along 
political lines. In this way the memorial becomes a contested site where political groups 
wage their cultural war for control over the national identity. But my argument questions the 
Gehry design as a symbol of post-modernism. If we can say that the principle purpose of the 
Gehry design is to encourage the imagination of spectators as well as display the cultural 
symbols we use to reference Eisenhower, the memorial can be effectively approached as a 
rhetorical artifact with persuasive intentions and identifiable discursive strategies that work 
to both critique and to construct a public memory of Eisenhower. Frank Gehry’s proposed 
Eisenhower memorial uses public spectacle but distributes that spectacle within a narrative 
collage that invites audience members to actively participate, both as members of a collective 
and as individuals, in constructing a shared memory of the memorial’s subject.  
The task of Gehry’s design does not appear to restrict meaning—as some have 
argued—but for the individual who is trapped in a web of semiotic ethnocentrism to 
somehow imagine difference, or imagine a way of seeing the world that is always in process. 
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Contemporary memorials like Gehry’s might offer a place to confront the past, to inhabit a 
space of knowing, and still play with meaning.  
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Dwight D. Eisenhower (Center) With Friends, 17 Years Old, 1907 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, 
I wish to express our thanks to Chairman Bishop and the Committee for the opportunity to 
testify today. I would also like to echo the appreciation we have for everyone—Congress, the 
Eisenhower Memorial Commission, and architect Frank Gehry—for their commitment to a 
memorial to Dwight D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. 
My sister, Anne, is with us from New York. On behalf of the Eisenhower family, we are 
grateful to Chairman Bishop for introducing a bill to sustain the momentum on the building 
of an Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, D.C. 
On hearing the news of this bill, Eisenhower Memorial Commission Chairman Rocco 
Siciliano said in an email reported in the press: “I am saddened by Congressman Bishop’s 
attempt to thwart the memorialization of one of America’s greatest generals and presidents, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower.” 
My family and I respectfully, but emphatically, disagree: 
Congressman Bishop’s legislation is designed to assure a memorial to Dwight Eisenhower, 
not to thwart it. From the moment the current design was adopted, some members of the 
Commission and the staff were determined to link the proposed Frank Gehry design to the 
very future of the memorial itself. This is unprecedented in the history of presidential 
memorials. This rigidity has damaged the effort to build a memorial. The approach has made 
adversaries out of stakeholders and alienated even the greatest supporters of this process. 
Mr. Chairman, you and Chairman Issa have been the first to address the impasse that has 
unfortunately developed.  We applaud you both for your efforts. We would also like to thank 
the co-sponsors of your bill. Continuation of the status quo, as you have pointed out, will 
doom the prospect of building a memorial. You are right that no consensus on the memorial 
design has emerged and that it is time to go back to the drawing board, with an open process 
for a new design of the memorial. 
Significant stakeholders believe that the Gehry design is, regretfully, unworkable. My family 
– as well as countless members of the public and the media – thinks the design is flawed in 
concept and overreaching in scale. The recent durability study notes the limited lifetime of 
the metal scrims, as well as the potential ice and snow hazard to the public. It also notes that 
the current design, to meet presidential memorial specifications, would require a duplicate set 
of scrims to be furnished—with the additional costs that would entail. Yet despite all this, the 
Commission’s approach is to plow ahead with a design that has virtually no support outside 
of a percentage of the architectural community—which has understandably rallied more in 
defense of architect Frank Gehry than for the specific memorial design itself. 
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For more than ten years my family raised concerns and objections that were ignored. We 
believe they were never adequately communicated to all the Commission members. Any 
disagreement we had with them was criticized as an attempt to scuttle the building of the 
memorial. This could not be farther from the truth. The president’s only surviving son, our 
father, John S. D. Eisenhower, has been clear about his desire to see a memorial, but one 
which reflects his father’s values and enjoys national consensus. More than once this year he 
has weighed in, most recently this fall in a letter to the late Senator Daniel Inouye.  I am 
providing a copy of the letter today, but the key points he writes are this: 
• Though “creative, the scope and scale of it [the Gehry design] is too extravagant and 
it attempts to do too much. On the one hand it presumes a great deal of prior 
knowledge of history on the part of the average viewer. On the other, it tries to tell 
multiple stories. In my opinion, that is best left to museums.” 
• “Taxpayers and donors alike will be better served with an Eisenhower Square that is 
a green open space with a simple statue in the middle, and quotations from his most 
important sayings. This will make it possible to utilize most of the taxpayer 
expenditures to date without committing the federal government or private donors to 
pay for an elaborate and showy memorial that has already elicited significant public 
opposition.” 
• “Though the members of the Eisenhower family are grateful to those who conceived 
of this memorial and have worked hard for its success, we have come to believe that 
the Eisenhower Memorial Commission has no intention of re-examining the concept, 
even though there would be ample historic precedent for it. It is apparently interested 
only in convincing us of the virtues of the present design, ignoring my objections as 
articulated by my daughters Anne and Susan.” 
• “I am the first to admit that this memorial should be designed for the benefit of the 
people, not our family…You may or may not agree with our viewpoint. However, we 
as a family cannot support the Eisenhower Memorial as it is currently designed – in 
concept, scope or scale.” 
• ”We request that lawmakers withhold funding the project in its current form and 
stand back from approving the current design.” 
The Eisenhower family does support the effort to revitalize this process. Among the first 
steps might be to defund the current design, including zeroing out money for staff 
expenditures, except to provide services related to an open and transparent financial 
accounting of monies used to date, as well as those already committed. A thorough review of 
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the fundraising studies commissioned in the past should also be undertaken, as well as the 
current efforts underway so that we can assess financial needs going forward. 
To expedite this process, perhaps an effort should be made to establish a neutral, non-partisan 
group to review the elements mentioned above. They could propose the needed 
organizational changes required for building a strong, responsive commission that can 
manage an open competitive design process and succeed in building a national consensus on 
a new memorial design. 
Members of my family wish to thank, again, Chairman Rob Bishop and the Committee for 
holding this hearing, for their commitment to finding a way to resolve this impasse, and for 
the opportunity to participate. We are deeply grateful to all of Congress for their effort in 
building a lasting memorial to Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION: THE INFLUENCE OF BIG RHETORIC ON PUBLIC 
MEMORY AND MONUMENTS 
 
 
Upon reviewing some of the principles of Big Rhetoric discussed, I think it is fair to 
say that Big Rhetoric as a subcategory of spectacle connotes more than “empty theatrics.” Its 
end result is for something more than “a passionate release” or “zombification.” Rather, the 
use of these oversized objects disturbs and disrupts the status quo. Big Rhetoric has the 
capacity to produce new opportunities for history-telling (Gehry’s Eisenhower Monument) 
and challenge efforts to regulate public opinion (Ferris’ Great Pleasure Wheel). It can expand 
the public’s imagination and unsettles expectations of reality. To borrow from Aristotle, Big 
Rhetoric has the capacity to be in the story and simultaneously remain independent or outside 
the story. When the audience views the world through Big Rhetoric, the distinction between 
reality and imagination blurs. 
Some colossal texts fail to produce a stirring reaction because they fail to transport 
the audience out of themselves; they fail to produce wonder. In contrast, big objects that have 
the ability to create a dynamic tension with their environment, to counter the cultural and 
physical landscape, can become important texts for social transformation; their voices help to 
both alter the physical landscape and shape the conversation about the future. In these cases, 
Big Rhetoric participates in the public expression of new ideas and new ways of seeing the 
world. While the expressions of Big Rhetoric are experienced by individuals, they are also 
shared by a community, both physically and conceptually. The structure and the audience 
who view it are each part of a complex visual relationship. The group gathered around the 
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big object must enter and share space with the buildings or monuments: the spectators 
become part of the physical landscape and part of the spectacle and thus part of the rhetorical 
text. To say this another way, the audience of Big Rhetoric are not spectators but participants 
in shaping Big Rhetoric and its place in the public sphere.  
To give this relationship the attention it deserves, in Chapter 2 I drew on the 
rhetorical concept of megethos to explore Diocletian’s use of the monument genre to 
transform victory into political power. Focusing on the artifact, the memory landscape, and 
accounts by classical historians, the analysis examined the changes to the memory landscape 
over time and how Diocletian’s use of magnitude (megethos) attempted to both transform 
and disrupt the collective memory of the people in Alexandria. To avoid the problems of a 
scattered and therefore limited rhetorical account, the concept of megethos as an analytical 
framework was used to highlight Big Rhetoric’s dialectic properties. The relationship 
between Diocletian’s Column and the memory landscape of the Serapeum reveals religious 
and political expressions co-existing, each nourishing the other.   
In Chapter 3, I extended the dialectic possibilities of Big Rhetoric by using Aristotle’s 
idea of opsis and Bachelard’s philosophy of imagination to study the audience’s experience 
of spectacle during the great exhibitions of the 19th century, not only phenomenologically but 
as constituting an ontology--that is, imagination’s unique ability to do more than simply 
reproduce perception but to deform images provided by perception, to liberate the auditor 
from the mental imitation of reality. To analyze the effects of Big Rhetoric, I examined 
personal correspondence from World fairgoers, reports by well-established local and national 
newspapers publicizing the event, and promotional material such as pamphlets and flyers. 
Spectacles such as Bloom’s Amusement Zone may offer a visual relationship that counteracts 
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master narratives like those found at the World’s Columbian Exposition, encouraging instead 
opportunities for collective imagination.   
Chapter 4 investigated contemporary memorial design and the democratic process of 
building Big Rhetoric by examining the proposed design and discourse surrounding the 
development of Frank Gehry’s Eisenhower Memorial. Because the example of Big Rhetoric 
in this case is still under development and has already gone through three revisions, the 
chapter focused on the heated discussions between the Eisenhower family, designer Frank 
Gerhy, and the Congressional subcommittee.  
 
Memory and Monumentality  
 
For Big Rhetoric stands at the intersection of the public and private where memories 
of the past are crafted into material form, a form where audience, rhetor, and text speak to 
one another. Shared memory, or public memory, differs from personal memories in that they 
are fashioned from these material expressions in the public sphere, and are often situated 
between historical fidelity and present-day political motives. Mitchell Reye’s argues that 
rhetoricians interested in this phenomenon have “yet to attend sufficiently to memory’s 
material manifestations and the way in which they shape affective experience” (595). Reyes 
argument calls for rhetorical scholars to understand the tension between the public and 
private by looking closer at the material of public memory and the public texts that 
authenticate and authorialize memory. Examining this relationship necessarily requires an 
examination of what defines a monument and its relationship to public memory as a tool for 
state sponsored social control.  
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The word monument comes from the Latin word monere, which means “to warn” or 
“remind.” The monument is therefore a special kind of rhetorical instrument that works to 
bring together communal memories and aspirations. Stephen Browne explains that the most 
important function of the traditional monument is to “fix collective identity in the present” 
(201). For Brown, the act of memorializing the past is more than commemoration; it is an 
afterlife of memory, a material reconstruction of the past that sanctions certain interpretations 
and not others. Blair et al. add that such places are significant because “they select from 
history those events, individuals, places, and ideas that will be sacralized by a culture” (377).  
Blair points out two rhetorical advantages of the monument genre: monuments allow certain 
social groups to “sacralize” certain events, values, and stories, and they enable them to 
sustain that sacralization with a lasting material manifestation. The monument operates as a 
mechanism for connecting personal values with group values and for ascribing a 
community’s aspirations onto a material presence—or more accurately, a symbolic 
representation that serves as a reference for community members. A call to remembrance, 
monuments often work to promote particular dominant ideologies, and they leave a lasting 
material and cultural presence on the landscape. The act of selecting particular events reveals 
the epideictic nature of monuments, and that partiality also reveals their rhetorical nature.  
Cecil Elliott explains the characteristics of a rhetorically successful monument. First, 
says Elliot, the subject of the monument must have lasting significance to the audience. If the 
audience deems the subject pedantic, the celebratory effect is nullified. Second, the material 
of the monument must communicate permanency: marble and granite, for example, help 
communicate the durability of both the monument and its ideas. Finally, the traditional 
monument must lack complexity. The monument, says Elliot, must “deal with ideas that are 
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expressed in general and simple terms. Their nature requires that they be assigned in a way 
that is neither casual nor personal” (52). A common way of understanding monumentality, 
then, is that a monument uses some material form to allow the past to exist in the present. 
The monument gives material shape to the ephemeral images of significant events. Barry 
Schwartz explains that a monument “lifts from an ordinary historical sequence those 
extraordinary events which embody our deepest and most fundamental values” (377). The 
WWII memorial in Hawaii exemplifies the simple and celebratory characteristics of 
traditional monumentality.  
In March of 1958, President Eisenhower authorized construction of the memorial to 
honor 2,400 sailors who died during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Alfred Preis, the 
lead architect on the project, ordered that a bridge be constructed over a sunken battleship, 
the U.S. Arizona, and the bridge would float above the sunken ship and should in no way 
touch any part of the ship below1. When construction finished, Preis said the bridge “stands 
strong and vigorous at the ends … The overall effect is one of serenity. Overtones of sadness 
have been omitted….” (Langmead 462).  
                                                
1 The USS Arizona is visited by over one million visitors every year. The structure is 184-feet long with two 
peeks at the end and a sag in the middle. Critiques of the memorial describe the design as a “crumpled milk 
carton.” The memorial also contains an opening in the floor over the hull of the sunken ship.  
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Figure 1: Photograph of the USS Arizona. 
 
Preis's intentional omission of any "sad" feelings from the memorial's design reveal his 
modernist vision for an idealistic future. The utopian dream of modernism can be seen in 
many traditional monuments of that time period. In the Preis design, strength and vigor 
repress sadness and hope to redeem us from the past. As shown by Preis, the act of 
memorializing the past is more than commemoration; it is an afterlife of memory, a material 
reconstruction of the past that sanctions certain interpretations and not others. To understand 
how Preis’ design accomplishes its intended purpose for the audience, the concept of 
spectacle should be considered more closely.  
Some scholars warn against monuments such as the one constructed by Pries. Dan 
Flavin says the monument can either provide a clearer perception of physical reality free 
from the general claims of “purity and idealism” or, as Theodore Adorno adds, falsely 
redeems events with “mimetic pleasure” (86). Both Flavin and Adorno introduce problems 
with memorializing that give rise to questions about a memorial process that confronts the 
past and resists redemption. How can a national state incorporate death, grief, and general 
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sadness into its national memory landscape. What commemorative practices allow the state 
to confront its misdeeds? How should we remember slavery or the Salem witch trials? Some 
designs, I have argued, challenge the conventions of memorial design and respond to the 
needs of the immediate time and place, representing a compelling alternative to traditional 
memorialization. I will introduce three emerging practices that, as Young says, “breach the 
conventions of the 'memorial code,” and represent future sites of analysis for Big Rhetoric 
(7).  
 
New Methods of Memorializing 
Scholars and artists in the more recent present have explored alternative memorial 
practices, branching into more critical and complex approaches to engaging with the past. 
Johansen's “Falling Pillar,” for example, called by scholars a “non monument,” breaks from 
the traditional approach of durability and longevity.  Alison Daly's “Covering of Versailles,” 
attacks and challenges the traditional monuments’ ability to obscure the past. Her approach 
has been labeled by many as the anti-monument.  And the most recent proposal for a D.C. 
monument, the Eisenhower memorial, represents the alternative memorial practice of 
narrative collage. 
The Non Monument 
Challenging the permanent nature of monuments, the non monument tends to provoke 
rather than console the audience. It adopts characteristics of the traditional monument--
grandiose in scale, important subject--and simultaneously avoids the iconic representation 
common during the late nineteenth century. The non monument is often ironic and self-
effacing; it reflects an uncertain future. Blair calls these monuments a “post-modern response 
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to memory” because they avoid the modernist commitment to idealism. Referring to the 
antagonistic relationship between the modern and post-modern, Blair says the post-modern 
“displaces the tendencies of its modernist counterpart by 1) a refusal of unities or universals, 
2) attention to and use of context, and 3) an interrogative, critical stance." (266). The post-
modern monument, or non monument, embraces pluralism and resists the metanarrative. 
Germany's relationship with the holocaust provides a good example of how the non 
monument may offer a more appropriate mnemonic response to the complexity of history. In 
Germany’s case, the perpetrator of the holocaust must also mourn the victims of the 
genocide.  
Jochen Gerz decided against the authoritative rigidity of the traditional Holocaust 
memorial when he was invited to construct a Holocaust monument for Harburg, Germany. 
Instead of creating the monument and introducing his design to the public, Gerz asked the 
people of Harburg to change the design of his slowly sinking pillar. He positioned the sinking 
pillar inside a shopping mall and the unconventionality of the site for the holocaust memorial 
lent to its disruptive nature. The forty-feet-high pillar monument was built from dark, grey 
lead. Four stylus pencils were attached to the four corners of the monument. And at the base 
of the monument, an inscription in German, French, English, Russian, Hebrew, Arabic, and 
Turkish read: 
We invite the citizens of Harburg, and visitors to the town, to add their 
names here to ours. In doing so, we commit ourselves to remain vigilant. 
As more and more names cover this 12 meter tall lead column, it will 
gradually be lowered into the ground. One day it will have disappeared 
completely, and the site of the Harburg monument against fascism will be 
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empty. In the end, it is only we ourselves who can rise up against injustice. 
(Young 130)  
 
There are two notable differences between Gerz's disappearing pillar and Pier's floating 
bridge. First, the temporality of the monument requires more immediate action from the 
audience. The fact that in two years time the column will disappear from the natural 
landscape compels a response. And second, the invitation to mark the monument’s surface 
gives the audience of the column some authorship over the column. Gerz's monument invites 
shoppers of the Harburg shopping center to commit their names to the idea of social justice. 
The invitation to sign the column is a sort of petition, a collective decision, and so the 
column is both a mnemonic device and social contract. Gerz's decision is in direct conflict 
with Elliot's recommendation that the monument must communicate permanency if it is to be 
successful. For Gerz, the monument's durability is less important than his invitation to act.   
The nonmonument encourages auditors to express themselves and make critical social 
decisions about what is valuable to the community. The impulse to redeem the past is 
forfeited, replaced with a desire for accountability. As Gerz' pillar falls, and is eventually 
covered over, the monument also allows the rhetorical landscape to change in a dramatic 
fashion. Where once stood a 12-meter lead column now reveals an empty space in the 
shopping complex. The landscape is free to make new associative references and shoppers 
can find new ways of remembering and engaging with the past. The memorial itself becomes 
part of the community’s past. 
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The Anti-Monument 
 
Like the non monument, the anti-monument resists the authority of the traditional 
monument. A strategic strike against the metanarrative introduced by a particular monument 
or series of monuments, the anti-monument uses persuasive means to generate a “critical 
moment” for the audience, a moment of reflection and critique. But these monuments often 
work in absence rather than substance, which is to say they remove the political symbols and 
replace them with abstract ones. Anne Daly uses the term “anti-monuments,” because the 
artifact actively resists authoritative social forces in the built environment. Like the non 
monument, the anti monument offers a critique of how the past is remembered but with 
greater critical force. The objective of the anti-monument is not to create a new monument 
but to subvert the already established practice of monument building. Daly’s anti monument 
project, “Looking for the Labyrinth: Re-collecting Versailles,” covers the imposing, 
authoritative aesthetic of baroque excessiveness in the garden. Her work is in direct 
opposition to monumentalism found in the public space.  
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             Figure 2: Part of a series of photographs taken by Anne Daly in the garden of Versailles 
 
The decision to leave part of the monument uncovered emphasizes the disempowered figure. 
The figure is shrouded in darkness and blind. The transformed figure communicates a sense 
of disorientation. The statue no longer signifies the baroque ideals of the past but points to 
the discourse of monumentality—how objects of representation can assert powerful messages 
about the past—encouraging viewer circumspection. 
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Narrative Collage 
 Recent commemorative practices, like the artifact I’ve included in the penultimate 
chapter of this dissertation (Gehry’s design), point to something more than a moment of 
critique. These post-post-modern texts, or what Della Polloch calls pseudo-modern texts, 
create an opportunity for socially constructed meaning that promotes active reception rather 
than passive acceptance; they use symbolic referents located in the culture (without irony) to 
generate political power for the collective. Frank Gehry’s proposed Eisenhower monument 
invites audience members to actively participate, both as members of a collective and as 
individuals, in constructing a shared memory of Eisenhower.	   
Gehry’s design for the Eisenhower monument in Washington D.C. features a tree 
filled square bordered by 10 stone columns. Nowhere in the monument is a central figure. 
Attached to the columns are a series of metal tapestries that depict the president’s hometown 
of Abilene, Kansas. The columns and tapestries stand 80 feet tall and surround three 
sculptures depicting different periods of the president’s life. Two sculpture reliefs, one of 
Eisenhower as the military commander and one depicting Eisenhower as president create two 
sides of triptych with a young Eisenhower reading a book in the middle panel. The boy is 
meant to be reading the future events of his life, and the words of his most famous speeches 
are laid on sandstone behind the triptych. The three quotes are from the Guildhall Address, 
the Homecoming Speech, and the Farewell Address. 
The collage approach allows for an interactive text, a rizomatic structure, with no 
identifiable central meaning. Instead, the elements of the collage are distributed almost at 
random to allow the audience to participate in constructing their memory of the event or 
person. To attempt a standard unified reading of the collage is to miss the point. The text 
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offers a multitude of readings, sometimes even conflicting readings. This process of 
constructing memory might be applied to our own approach of making sense of the past. By 
inviting the audience to author their own experience with the collage, authorial intention 
becomes negligible. However, the memory of the past can still be somewhat redemptive or 
inspiring with this approach.  
The tendency at this point would be to argue for a particular monument strategy, to 
select one of the methods listed above as the most correct for addressing the problem of false 
redemption in the traditional monument. That is an understandable impulse; memory 
practices such as these have long-term implications for the community. But the proliferation 
of monument and memorial practices actually serves to promote a more comprehensive 
approach to memorialization. In addition to the three monument practices explored here, 
other strategies might meet the immediate demands of the circumstances and exigencies of 
the moment.  For example, Chandler Sanchez, chairman of the Pueblo Indian tribe, referring 
to our newest national monument, says “the story of my tribe, the Pueblo of Acoma, and our 
history is intimately connected to Chimney Rock” (“Supportive Statement”). The 
relationship between the Pueblo people and Chimney Rock reveals a memorializing practice 
that requires no modification of the natural landscape. Still other monument practices exist, 
alternative ways of remembering as a community that also respond to the immediate needs of 
place, audience, and purpose. There are, therefore, many possibilities of employing 
monuments to render contemporary problems with the past with a sensitivity to both the 
complexity of the past and the needs of surrounding circumstances.  
This dissertation considered how the spectacle of monumentality is designed, 
delivered, received, and remembered as a prominent form of public discourse, which 
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rhetorical analysis is uniquely qualified to illuminate. The chapters explored how the 
deployment of large rhetorical artifacts is a form of cultural and identity politics, in 
conversation with historical narrative, collective memory, and the physical landscape. 
Monumentality in this sense is both a locus of commemoration and a repository for histories 
that run parallel to official accounts.  
 
For Future Study 
 
As stated earlier in this discussion, this study is preliminary and the influences of Big 
Rhetoric discussed in each chapter begin to point towards areas for further study. The 
implications of Big Rhetoric in the genres discussed in this study include only a few of the 
possibilities. Big Rhetoric as an instrument for social transformation leads to another vast 
area of rhetorical analysis. For example, an audience reception analysis of activist Big 
Rhetoric may shed light on understanding the role of Big Rhetoric in shaping alternative 
political opinion. A study of this nature could eventually change our use of Big Rhetoric as a 
tool for civic engagement. From a professional standpoint, it may also be profitable to 
examine new methods, such as digital texts, for creating the effects of Big Rhetoric.  
Three-dimensional virtual reality in urban planning, for example, is using image-
processing technology to design realistic, interactive historical landscapes. Some historians 
are using this technology to recreate the built environment of significant moments of the past 
(see Lisa Snyder’s project “The World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893”). These historians 
are trying to capture the spectacle of the exposition communicated to 19th century audiences. 
Of course, the limitations of image-processing introduce new problems. The most obvious 
limitation is that this kind of experience is a visual representation as opposed to a multi-
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sensory immersion. This raises a fundamental question: what is lost or gained when Big 
Rhetoric is introduced in a virtual reality application?	  
 In sum, many scholars note that the practice of building big objects for public 
consumption typically works to promote and communicate ideology and to reinforce 
particular worldviews. In this sense, Big Rhetoric is seen as a semiotic referent for a 
particular set of beliefs. However, a close analysis of the big objects introduced in this study 
reveals in many ways that Big Rhetoric can challenge reductive history-telling practices, or 
in the case of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition, present the audience alternative 
views about the future. I have argued that Big Rhetoric works to destabilize and decentralize 
reality and creates an “imaginative moment” for the audience. And, as Aristotle reminds us, 
the public spectacle of Big Rhetoric transforms the built environment into a stage and its 
buildings, inhabitants and objects into characters, audience, and props within it. In that 
imaginative space it is possible to formulate images that go beyond perceptions of reality.  
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